served more than four months before the actual close of the year." To the same effect is Wanger v. Raymond, 104 Pa., 33. In that case there was also a mistake in date. True, it was "a manifest blunder," but the Court ruled; "It was explicit and clear, however, in this that possession was demanded, at the expiration of the lease. This was sufficient."

When the defendant received the notice he was advised that Mr. Dunn was the owner of the premises by purchase. The defendant recognized the new landlord by paying the rent to him. He had notice from Mr. Dunn himself, as early as December 27th, that the latter was the owner of the property and also that he intended to occupy the same at the expiration of the tenant's lease. He again stated that he wanted the premises at the expiration of the tenant's term.

And now June 22nd 1920, the rule to open the judgment is discharged.

MILLER ET AL. v. JOHNSON ET AL.

Joint County Bridge-Power to Close Such Bridge Undergoing Repair-Discretion of County Commissioners-Interruption of Public Service by Reason of the Closing of a Bridge-Public Service Commission.

The County Commissioners have lawful authority, in the exercise of the duties cast upon them by the Statutes regulating inter-county bridges, to make such repairs and should it be necessary for the purpose of properly making such repairs to close the bridge temporarily and for a reasonable time.

The duty rests upon the County Commissioners in such cases to determine in the exercise of their official judgment and whether such temporary closing is necessary.

Unless the decision of the County Commissioners is so plainly, manifestly and egregiously wrong that it can be pronounced an abuse of discretion, the Court ought not by injunction to set it aside, substituting its judgment in the place of the official judgment of the Commissioners.

Notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs had a certificate of public convenience for the operation of their vehicles in the carriage of passengers over a road which embraces an inter-county bridge, the Public Service Commission, under the Act of 26 July, 1913, P. L. 1374, did not acquire jurisdiction over the highways to be used by the plain. tiffs in the carriage of their passengers so that the authorities charged with the care of such highways may not close them temporarily to make repairs without applying for and obtaining the permission of the Public Service Commission so to do.

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County. Sitting in Equity. No. 2727 Equity Docket. Motion for preliminary injunction against the County Commissioners of the Counties of Washington and Westmoreland to restrain them from closing the Donora-Webster InterCounty Bridge.

tiffs.

D. M. Anderson, Acheson & Crumiine, for the plain

Alvin E. Doonan, County Solicitor for Washington County. William S. Rial, County Solicitor for Westmoreland County, for defendants.

Brownson, J.: The bridge over the Monongahela river, extending from Donora in Washington county to Webster in Westmoreland county, is an inter-county bridge built by said two counties and the boards of County Commissioners thereof are jointly charged with its maintenance and repair. They are now engaged in making repairs of this bridge. The plan of these repairs includes the construction of concrete flooring upon the bridge approaches. The commissioners have given public notice that during the construction of this flooring the bridge will be closed to vehicle travel, and the plaintiffs who are operating a line of passenger motor omnibuses, upon a route which passes upon and over this bridge, have applied for a preliminary injunction to restrain the county commissioners and their contractor from so closing the bridge to public travel.

The plaintiffs set up, as the ground upon which they are entitled to equitable relief, that such interruption of vehicle traffic will result in the following injurious consequences; (1) Plaintiffs are required by the certificate of public convenience granted to them by the Public Service Commission to maintain an uninterrupted service upon the route aforesaid, and if they are prevented from so doing by the closing of the bridge they may forfeit their certificate; (2) such interruption in the use of the bridge for the purposes of their business will cause them to suffor a considerable loss of revenue; and (3) an interruption of their passenger traffic will work great inconvenience and detriment to the general public.

This proposed temporary closing of the bridge to vehicle traffic will not prevent the plaintiffs from operating their transportation facilities upon any part of their prescribed route other than the bridge itself; they may still run their omnibuses on either side thereof, so that passengers, alighting from an omnibus at one end of it, may walk across the bridge (which is not proposed to be closed to foot passengers) and take another omnibus, for the purpose of pursuing their journeys, after so doing. True, this would impose upon the plaintiffs increased operating expenses, making it necessary to hire two additional employes and to rent temporarily some storage accomodations at the Monessen end of their route, and it would be somewhat inconvenient for the traveling public but it could be done. And if they should continue to serve the public to this extent we take it that (assuming that the bridge is lawfully closed temporarily to vehicles) the Public Service Commission would neither be disposed nor permitted to declare a forfeiture of their rights because they were thus, by causes beyond their own control, prevented from operating over the whole of their prescribed route, even if, in other circumstances, a forfeiture might be declared.

In any event, however, it may be a question whether a private party can maintain a bill against the officers in charge of a highway for the purpose of preventing an interruption of such party's traveling, in common with the general public over the highway, even though it be alleged that the consequentially resulting inconvenience and loss in his business will be one special to the plaintiff; see Gold v. Philadelphia, 115 Pa. 184, Phila. etc., Ry. Co. v. Philadelphia 11 Phila. 358; Naugle v. Nescopeck Twp.; 255 Pa. 68.

But, passing over the question of the standing of the plaintiffs to sue, let us consider whether it is proper, by injunction, to restrain the county commissioners from carrying out their plans.

This bridge is under the charge and care of these boards of county commissioners. They are, as public officers, in control of it. It is their official duty to determine when it needs repair, and what the nature of the repairs should be. If the flooring of either the bridge proper or

the approaches need renewing, they have the official discretion to determine what kind of new flooring is requisite to make it answer the requirements of public travel. And the time and manner of doing the work of thus repairing the structure are matters to be decided by them in the exercise of their official discretion. The commissioners have decided that the approaches of this bridge, consisting of viaducts leading at either end to the bridge proper which spans the river, ought to be floored with concrete upon the cartway thereof. Upon the advice of their engineer they have decided that, during the process of laying this concrete, and until it shall have had time to set, it is necessary that the bridge shall be closed to vehicle traffic, in order to keep the concreting free from the interference of vibration with its setting properly, and they have accordingly directed their contractor so to close it. Upon the correctness of this decision, and the practicability or impracticability, by the use of certain precautionary measures, of properly constructing the concrete flooring while keeping the bridge open to travel, the evidence in the case is conflicting. The plaintiffs ask ns to decide that the commissioners are wrong in their decision, and that it is practicable to keep the bridge open while the concreting is being done.

It would seem to us that upon this question the weight of the evidence does not preponderate in the plaintiffs' favor. But is it proper for the court to review such a decision made by the county commissioners, and to substitute its judgment upon such a question in the place of theirs? The discretion of public officers, acting within the limits of their authority, cannot be controlled by injunction: Throop on Public Officers, sec. 849, quoted in Oakford v. Sheatz, 19 Dist, R. 1113, 1114; Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U. S. 347; Warfel v. Cochran, 34 Pa. 381; Roth v. Marshall, 158 Pa. 272. 274; Henderson Coal Co. v. Sadler, et al, No. 2678 Equity Docket, in this court. There are many other authorities to the same effect. "Equity can only interfere with the functions of the county commissioners either for disregard of a positive duty as prescribed by statute or a clear abuse of discretion:" Bradbury v. Burschell, 220 Pa. 439, 446, opinion of Newcomb. J., adopted by the Supreme Court. "If an officer neglects or refuses to enter upon the discharge of a duty which the

law imposes upon him, the courts will quicken or compel action by a writ of mandamus. If he goes beyond what the law requires, attempts that which is ultra vires, or abuses his discretion in any manner, the courts will restrain him by injunction. The ground intermediate these extremes is the legitimate range of official discretion, within which the officer, on whom the law has cast a duty, may determine the manner of its performance: "Mr. Justice Williams in Roth v. Marshall, supra, at page 274.

It is clear that these commissioners have lawful authority, in the exercise of the duties cast upon them, by the statutes regulating such bridges, to make these repairs, and, should it be necessary so to do for the purpose of properly making the repairs, to close the bridge, temporarily and for a reasonable time, to that end. It is clear also that the duty rests upon them to determine, in the exercise of their official judgment and discretion whether such a temporary closing is necessary. In deciding that a closing is necessary in this instance the commissioners are not shown to have acted in bad faith, or otherwise than in the exercise of their honest judgment, and in support of this judgment they have presented professional and expert opinions. The fact that in the original contract for the doings of these repairs they stipulated that the contractor should at all times keep the bridge open for travel does not impeach their good faith in subsequently changing their views to the extent of coming to the conclusion that a closing during the concreting work is necessary. Unless this decision is so plainly manifestly and egregionsly wrong that it can be pronounced an abuse of discretion, the court, under the authorities above cited, ought not to set it aside, substituting its judgment in the place of the official judgment of the commissioners. We cannot so say under the evidence in this case.

It is suggested, however, that when the Public Service Commission granted to the plaintiffs a certificate of public convenience for the operation of their vehicles in the carriage of passengers over a route which embraces this bridge, the Commission not only acquired jurisdie. tion over the plaintiffs in the matter of requiring them to comply with their duties in the premises, but also acquir. ed jurisdiction over the highways to be used by them in