figure. This in itself would indicate the existence of some arrangement other than for board between these people; and this view is substantiated by the testimony of Mrs. Miller. On one occasion during a visit to claimant's house, the witness was told by decedent that "Mary has been good to me and she shall have what belongs to me, all my belongings." When asked why he made no will to that effect, he replied, "I need no will, that's will enough." These declarations of decedent, in the circumstances, are very significant. They strongly support the belief that, in addition to his board, he expected to pay claimant for her unusual services to him, and, we think, bring the claim within that class of cases where the proof, falling short of the requirements of a contract to bequeath a legacy in consideration of services rendered in the lifetime of testator, nevertheless entitles claimant to recover just compensation for services inadequately paid for: Ardisson's Estate, 28 Dist. R. 999. To sum up, we have here the case of a decedent, no blood relative of claimant, blind, helpless, of unclean habits and fitful temper, who was boarded for $5.00 a week by claimant and rendered such additional services by her as all experience shows are not performed by one for another without expectation of reward; declarations of decedent himself tend to show that he held out promises of extra compensation to claimant; and while we think her proof falls short of establishing a contract on his part to compensate her with a legacy of his estate, we are convinced that decedent intended, and common justice demands, that she be adequately paid for her services. Therefore, since the testimony is overwhelmingly to the effect that her claim is very moderate for the services rendered by her, it is allowed, and $875.00 will be distributed to her in full payment. With respect to the distribution of the balance, it appears, as we have already stated, that decedent is survived by no known next of kin. As to this balance, therefore, the estate would seem to be escheatable. So far as we know, no proceeding has been instituted for the escheat of this balance; and at the audit a suggestion was made that it might be a proper subject for proceeding by the Commonwealth under the provisions of the Act of May 16, 1919. We think this a good suggestion, and it may be brought to the attention of the Auditor General. In the meantime, we will turn the balance back to the accountant, with instructions to hold it pending action by the Auditor General of Pennsylvania. HARRY A. PRESTON v. GEORGE PILCH. Automobile Laws-Collision at Intersection of Streets-Contributory Negligence-Act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 678. 1. Where the paths of two approaching vehicles cross at intersection of public streets or highways, the driver on the left must give way, unless so far in advance of the other as to afford reasonable time to clear the crossing and thus in all probability avoid a collision. 2. Under Section 25 of the Act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 678, which provides that "at the intersection of public highways, the operator of a motor vehicle . shall pass to the right of such intersection before turning to the left," a failure to pass beyond the center line of the intersection highway before making a turn to the left is negligence on the part of such operator. Motion for judgment n. o. v. C. P. of Washington County, Pa., No. 114 August Term, 1921. Hughes & Hughes, for Plaintiff. Cummins, J., April 10, 1922. The plaintiff, on the 18th day of July, 1920, while driving his automobile eastwardly on Main street in the Borough of Bentleyville, turned to the left to drive out the Pittsburgh road, an intersecting street leading into Main street; and just as he was beginning to make the turn from Main street into the Pittsburgh road, his automobile collided with the motorcycle of the defendant being driven by defendant on Main street coming westwardly and keeping close to his own right hand side of the street. Upon trial the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in the sum of $55.67. The case now comes before the court upon motion for judgment n. o. v. The evidence upon trial clearly established negligence on the part of the defendant, and the only substantial question remaining for the court to dispose of is whether the plaintiff was himself, at the time of the collision, guilty of contributory negligence. Where two vehicles approach each other at an intersection of streets where their paths must necessarily cross, the vehicle first at the crossing had, at common law, the right of way: McClung v. Pennsylvania Taximeter Cab Company, 252 Pa. 478; Simon v. Lit Bros., Inc., 264 Pa. 121. This rule of the road resulted in many collisions and was changed by statutory enactment. Section 25 of the act of June 30, 1919, P. L. 678, provided that, "when two vehicles approach the intersection of two public highways at the same time, the vehicle approaching from the right shall have the right of way." This section means simply that, "where the paths of two approaching vehicles cross at intersections of the public streets, the driver on the left must give way, unless so far in advance of the other as to afford reasonable time to clear the crossing and thus, in all probability, avoid a collision": Weber v. Greenebaum, 270 Pa. (385) 382. According to the uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff, his automobile collided with defendant's motorcycle just as he was starting to turn onto the Pittsburgh road, and in such a way that it was virtually a head-on collision. They arrived at the point of intersection of these two roads at substantially the same time. Moreover, Section 25 of said act of 1919 also provided that, "at the intersection of public highways, the operator of a motor vehicle. shall pass to the right of such intersection before turning to the left." The plaintiff, however, according to the testimony of his own witnesses, before he had reached the intersection of the center lines of these two intersecting streets, turned to the left, so that he was, at the time of the collision, close to the left curb line of the Pittsburgh road. Had plaintiff continued on Main street, until he had passed the intersection of the center lines of these two streets before turning to the left, which the defendant had a right to assume that he would do (Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa 205; Brown v. Lynn, 31 Pa. 510; Reeves v. The D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 30 Pa. 454), it is clear that defendant would have first reached the point where their paths of travel, under the statutory law of the road, would have crossed each other. Hence, the defendant, driving his motorcycle on the right, had the of way, and plaintiff approaching from the left, in attempting to cross in front of defendant's motorcycle, was guilty of contributory negligence. and therefore not entitled to recover. DECREE And now, April 10, 1922, the above stated case came on to be heard upon motion for judgment n. o. v., and was argued; whereupon, upon consideration thereof and for the reasons set forth in the foregoing opinion, it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that judgment be entered against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, notwithstanding the verdict. ACTS OF ASSEMBLY CONSTRUED. Constitution of the United States, Nineteenth Amendment- 1772, March 21, 1 Sm. L. 364, Justice of the Peace, 386. 1815, March 13, Sm. L. 288, Divorce-Adultery, 149. 1848, April 11, P. L. 536, Husband and Wife, 254. 1853, April 18, Sec. 9, P. L. 507, Trusts and Perpetuities, 157. 1859, April 6, P. L. 387, Service of Process, 247. 1860, March 31, Sec. 66, P. L. 400, Penal Law, 287. 1866, April 11, P. L. 606, Return Days-Third Judicial District, 196. 1871, June 19, P. L. 1360, Equity Jurisdiction, 1360. 1874, April 22, Sec. 22, P. L. 108, Foreign Corporations, 147. 1879, June 4, Sec. 1, P. L. 841, Auditor's Compensation, 359. 1887, June 3, P. L. 332, Married Person's Act, 254. 1887, May 25, P. L. 271, Procedure Act, 254. 1893, June 8, P. L. 344, Husband and Wife, 142 and 254. 1901, May 16, P. L. 194-204, Negotiable Instruments, 347. 1903, March 25, P. L. 61, Affidavit on Appeal, 205. 1913, July 26, P. L. 1374, Jurisdiction of Public Service Com- 1915, May 14, P. L. 483, Practice Act, 7, 92, 139, 328, 347, 381, 383, 1915, May 19, P. L. 543, 555, Sales Act, 19. 1915, June 2, Sec. 315, P. L. 736, Workmen's Compensation Act, 71, 320 and 389. 1915, June 26, Article 3. Secs. 306-a and 306-c., P. L. 736, Work- 1917, May 24, P. L. 268, Fornication and Bastardy, 73. 1919, May 8, P. L. 137, Defective Ordinances, 287. 1919, June 26, Sec. 104, P. L. 642, Workmen's Compensation Act 1919, June 30, Secs. 19 and 25, P. L. 678, Motor Vehicles, 136 and 1921, May 5, Sec. 1, P. L. 407, Liquor License Act, 373. AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE. 1. Affidavit of defense must be specific and must answer alle- 2. An affidavit of defense setting up a new contract which is |