a sane and reasonable person, and testified that the ex-cessive use of this drug had undoubtedly unhinged her mentally at times; yet a close scrutiny of the testimony of all these witnesses will disclose the fact that none of them said that she was of unsound mind to such a degree that she did not know who her relatives were or what property she possessed, or that she, at times, did not seem to be all right. Indeed a number of the witnesses, including the son Robert, testified that at times she was real pleasant and knew fully what she was doing. Again, none of the witnesses for the contestant, with the exception of Katharine Donnell and a son, saw her on the days when the will and codicil were made, and, consequently, were not in a position to state from personal observation what her condition was at that time. The testimony of these witnesses loses weight, because it not only differs as to the effect of the use of the bromo seltzer on the decedent-some stating that after its use by her she was buoyed up, pleasant, bright and placid, others that it made her violent and irrational, but it fails to prove that she was under the influence of this drug on the days in question and that she did not possess sufficient strength and mental ability to make her will. Want of mental capacity must be shown to exist at the time of the execution of the will, and the difficulty with contestant's case is, that his witnesses disagree as to the effect of the drug on the decedent, and have falied to establish that at the time when she made the will and codicil, she was not competent to do so, either because she had taken the drug which had upset her mentally or because she had not taken it, and as a result had utterly collapsed in body and mind. It is true that the witnesses expressed the opinion that she was not competent to make a will in 1918, or execute a codicil in 1920, but this opinion was based largely on general observations and personal experiences or encounters with the decedent at different times, and not on personal and positive knowledge of the mental condition of the decedent on the days when she signed the said papers. Indeed, two of the witnesses for the contestant admitted that at the time of the making of the will and codicil and shortly before her death, she not only knew * what she was about, but that she was "shrewd" and knew "the difference between right and wrong." Flora Salt, who was a lodger at decedent's home, testified at page 47, after being asked how decedent's mind was on the day she made her will, answered, "Her mind was fine that day I thought the day she made the first will she was all right." Dr. Charles K. Kistler, who attended decedent from Jan. 15, 1921, to Feb. 10, 1921, testified that she died of general paresis, that between these dates "she was capable of doing business, that she had ideas at times that seemed quite strange to us, but she knew what was right and wrong She knew what a dollar was. She came into my place and when she came she knew if I overcharged her. She understood the value of a dollar. She was sharp enough in that respect." * It seems to us that this brief review of contestnant's evidence demonstrates that he has failed to furnish proof that decedent, on or about the time when she made the writings in question, did not know who her relatives were, what property she possessed or that she was incompetent to transact her own business, or did any foolish or unwise business act in handling her estate, from which mental incapacity could be inferred. Contestant's evidence "looked at separately" would not support a verdict against the will, even though no counter proof were adduced, and, consequently, the issue involved cannot be submitted to a jury: Sharpless' Estate, 134 Pa. 250, 261; Tetlow's Estate, supra. However, granting that contestant has presented a prima facie case, we think the opposing proof is so strong and overwhelming that a verdict against the will could not be allowed to stand. From proponents' testimony, it appears that the decedent went alone to the offices of Rothermel & Mauger, Esqrs., a reputable law firm of this city, who had been her attorneys for a number of years, and gave them instructions for the preparation of her will and codicil It was clearly shown by the testimony of both Mr. Manger and Mr. Rothermel that the decedent discussed fully with them the disposition she desired to make of her estate, and also offered reasons for putting the shares of the sons in trust; that she was positive and firm in the declaration of her wishes in the matter, and that she knew, beyond any doubt, the objects of her bounty, the property she possessed and the act she was engaged in when she executed. Both counsel, who had known her for years, testified that she was mentally all right and that she understood full well what she was doing when she made the will and codicil. "The draftsman of a will, especially if a lawyer or conveyancer, is always an important and usually the most important witness in the case, and where as here he had known the testator well for a long time and shows circumstances of voluntary and intelligent action by testator at the time, his testimony makes a prima facie case that requires very strong evidence to offset": Kane's, Estate 206 Pa. 204; Kutus v. Hager, 269 Pa. 103, 111. Proponents also submitted the testimony of H. O. Miller, treasurer of the Colonial Trust Company, where decedent had been a depositor since 1915, which shows that she consulted him occasionally about the matter of making investments; that she subscribed for Liberty bonds at their bank; that she deposited and withdrew money by checks drawn at her request; and that she was mentally all right, knew her property and had sufficient capacity to make a will. He stated that she came to the bank every now and then to transact business and that her conversation was coherent and proper, and that he saw no signs of using a drug." Other witnesses, notably two next door neighbors, testified that she conducted a rooming house, did all her own work, was a hard working woman, that her conduct was always proper, her conversation rational, and that she never did anything to their knowledge that indicated mental weakness. We thus have the testimony of those who saw decedent execute the writings, who advised her in the management of her estate, and of the next door neighbors who observed her conduct and conversation, all agreeing that she was mentally all right and knew her relatives and what property she possessed. All this testimony overwhelms the idea of mental incapacity at the time of the making of the will and the codicil, and shows the presence of those facts and conditions which accompany and constitute mental capacity. In Kline's Estate, 207 Pa. 191, it is said: "On an application for an issue devisavit vel non, the opinion of physicians and others that the testator did not have testamentary capacity, based on their observations of his mental weakness and lack of memory, cannot prevail against positive evidence that at the time the will was made testator knew his children and their names, knew what property he owned, and what disposition he wanted to make of it, was at the time doing business in his own name." The will and codicil themselves show that she possessed a full and detailed knowledge of her relations, and knew to whom she wanted to give her estate; and these writings, with the oral testimony of the attorneys, the treasurer of the Trust Company, the neighbors and Flora Salt, completely rebut the allegation of testamentary incapacity. The decedent undoubtedly used large quantities of bromo seltzer in her latter years, but the question is whether she was under the influence of this drug, or suffering from it mentally at the time of the preparation and execution of the purported will and codicil, and this in our opinion has been answered in the negative by the strong and overwhelming proof adduced by the propon ents. "An issue devisavit vel non on the ground of lack of testamentary capacity is properly refused by the Orphans' Court, where it appears from the overwhelming weight of all the evidence that the testator, although a man of intemperate habits, was at the time he gave instructions to his counsel as to the terms of his will, and also at the time of the execution of the will, perfectly sober and sane, and that he understood exactly what he was doing": Tasker's Estate 205 Pa. 455. The evidence in this case would not be sufficient to sustain a verdict against the will, and that is the test. And now, July 2, 1921, the action of the register admitting said will and codicil to probate is sustained and the appeal therefrom is dismissed. BOROUGH OF M'ADOO v. DAILEY. Act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 400-Act of May 28, 1907, P. L. 262-Act of May 8, 1919, P. L. 137-Municipal Paving Under Void Ordinance-Interest in Contract. The act of March 31, 1860, P. L. 400 makes it unlawful for any manager or agent of a municipality to be interested in any municipal contract. The act of May 28, 1907, P. L. 262 prohibits borough officers, agents and employes from being interested in any contract for the sale or furnishing supplies to the borough and provides for forfeiture of office or appointment. The act of May 8, 1919, P. L. 137 validates defective ordinances for paving. C. P. Schuylkill Co., No. 270, September Term, 1919. R. A. Freiler, for Motion. Opinion by Koch, J., November 8, 1920: This suit is brought to recover part of the cost of grading and macadamizing Tamaqua Street, where the same abuts the property of the defendant in the borough of McAdoo. The defendant resists payment because the work was done by one C. H. Moore, the borough engineer, under a contract made by and between himself and the borough. The evidence shows that the council of said borough in January, 1914, elected said Moore as borough engineer for a term of two years, and that he was again elected in January, 1916, for another term of two years. The contract under which he did the work is dated November 4, 1915. The contract states that Moore submitted his bid on the 5th of August, 1915, after the borough had duly advertised for bids and that the contract was awarded to him on the same day that his bid was submitted. The evidence shows that the borough ordinance authorizing the work to be done was not enacted and approved until the 24th day of August, 1915. The third section of the ordinance provides, "That specifications be drawn specifying the material to be used and the manner of using it in conformity with section one of this ordinance, and upon completion of said specifications the secretary of council is hereby directed to advertise for bids to be opened by council when council may award the contract to the lowest and best bidder," etc. These specifications for the work were |