ed in deed book Vol. 289, page 181, wherein Elizabeth M. Peters is the grantor. Thomas Ealer, the other complainant, was called as a witness and he testified as follows: "Q. Where do you live? A. No. 1250 Gordon Street. Q. No. 1250 Gordon Street is how close to Thirteenth and Gordon Streets? A. There is one door, the second door from Thirteenth and Gordon. Q. That is the Southeast Corner? A. Yes, sir. Q. The title to No. 1250 Gordon Street is in Minnie Ealer? A. Yes, sir. Q. Who was Minnie Ealer so far as you are con cerned? A. My wife. Q. She died? A. Yes, she died a little over a year ago. Q. Your wife died without a will A. Yes, sir. Q. How long have you lived at No. 1250 Gordon Street? A. Ten years as near as I can say. Q. Your wife purchased from Edwin G. Trexler? The plaintiff then referred the court to a deed from Edwin G. Trexler to Minnie Ealer recorded in deed book Vol. 213, page 176. FINDINGS OF LAW. First. The 14th Rule of Equity Practice of Pennsylvania as revised and amended by the Judiciary in 1911 provides as follows: "Rule 14. All bills, and subsequent pleadings including amendments exceeding one hundred consecutive words, shall be printed on white sized paper of a convenient size. Amendments shall be printed on one side only of the paper. Each party appearing by separate counsel shall be entitled to ten copies of all such pleadings. The amount paid for printing shall be allowed as costs of the cause. This rule shall not apply where counsel shall certify that his client by reason of poverty, is unable to pay for the same The prothonotary shall not permit any such unprinted pleadings to be filed, saving with such a certificate and saving also bills for injunction where counsel shall certify that there has not been time to print the same. And such injunction bills shall be withdrawn and deemed finally dismissed as of course, unless within twenty days after filing the same. printed copies are filed and served." On this question the appellate court in the case of Cooke v. Telegraph Co. 21 Pa. Sup. Ct. 43 Porter W. D. Justice rendering the opinion decides as follows: "The equity rules adopted by the Supreme Court, under the direction and by the authority of the act of the legisature, have all the force and effect of a positive statute. The prothonotary ought not, in the absence of the proper certificate, to have permitted the unprinted petition to be filed, but he may have been misled by the fact that the petition did not upon its face purport to be a bill in equity." See also Cassidy v. Knapp 167 Pa. 305 in relation to the enforcement of the equity rules. Second. The bil of complaint and as amended is defective and insufficient for want of parties. The premises mentioned in the bill and amendment are not owned by the plaintiffffs or either of them. The title to them is in their wives. The wife of one of the plaintiffs is deceased, who died without a will. The testimony does not disclose what heirs survived her. It is alleged and averred that the erection of the coal dump by the defendant would be a detriment to the value of the prem ises. A decision and decree of the court would not bar the wife of Thomas Sell, one of the plaintiffs, nor the heirs of Minnie Ealer, the deceased wife of the other plaintiff, from instituting and maintaining proceedings at law or equity for the same cause of action. That all parties having any interest in proceedings in equity must be made parties to the proceedings either as plaintiffs or defendants has been decided by numerous authorities. We will refer to a few of them. In the case of Gloninger et al. v. Hazard et al. 42 Pa. 389 Woodward J. delivering the opinion of the court says: "Now, the first observation to be made upon a case so presented is, that one of the parties interested in the question to be decided is not before us. Manifestly, Hazard and Earb have no interest in these questions. They make no claim to Hassinger's third part of the land. To them it is all one whether that interest passed under the voluntary assignment, under the proceedings on bankruptcy, or under the sheriff's sale of 1850. But there is a party somewhere, who is directly interested in the question, and that party is not in Court, and has no notice of the present proceedings. The questions presented for decision are nice and difficult, but our decision of them, without all the parties in interest before us, would be mere brutum fulmen. Wherefore, then should they be decided? What decency or Justice would there be in deciding a party's cause before he had been summoned to a hearing? The creditors of Hassinger, either the releasing creditors under the voluntary assignment, or the general creditors under the proceedings in bankruptcy, are most likely the party. If there is no existing assignee to represent them, one may be raised up. And when they, by a new assignee, or some other representative, appear, to contest the title of Gloninger's alienees, it will be soon enough to consider the question now prematurely presented. If we should decree a payment to the plaintiffs of the money which the defendants admit to be in bond, I cannot see how it would protect the defendants against the future suit of whoever may legally represent the creditors of Hassinger In a word, we are called on to decide mere abstract questions, instead a concrete case between appropriate parties. Every consideration of what is due to ourselves, as well as to the parties, forbids us to entertain such a case." In the case of Schall v. Schoener 1 Woodward Report 200 Woodward P. J. delivering the opinion of the court states the law as follows: "With the flexible forms of a Court of Equity, there is no reason why the name of the party in interest should not, in some way, be placed upon the record. "The general rule requires all persons interested in, or to be affected by, any demand, to be parties to the suit' Leigh v. Thomas 3 Ves. 312. All persons materially interested in the subject matter of a bill, either as plaintiffs or defendants, ought to be made parties to the suit, however numerous they may be. The reason is that the court may be enabled to make a complete decree between the parties, may prevent future litigation by taking away the necessity for a multiplicity of suits, and may make it perfectly certain that no injustice shall be done either to the parties before the court, or to the interests of others, by a decree that may be grounded upon a partial view only of the merits' West v. Randall 2 Mason's R. 181; 1 Foub Eq. (Laussat's Ed.) p. 222. If the want of proper parties appears on the face of the bill, it may be taken advantage of by plea or answer. 1 Story Eq. Section 242. If the defendant, in his answer, suggests the want of proper parties, the plaintiff may set the cause down for argument upon that objection only; but if he does not do this and proceeds to a hearing notwithstanding the objection, he will not, if the objection shall then be allowed, be entitle l as of course to an order for liberty to amend his bill by adding parties; but the court, if it think fit, may, dismiss the bill. Equity Rules No. 1. The difficulty in the present case is illustrated by the obvious consideration that if the parties were reversed, and this was a suit by Schoener against Scholl upon the very contract in controversy, and the record disclosed the interest of the assignee, the court would not move one step until Hollenbach should be made a party to the suit. "The bill is dismissed at the plaintiff's costs." In the case of Hartley v. Lang-Kamp & Elder 243 Pa. 550 Mestrezat J. delivering the opinion of the court decides: "It is a settled rule of equity Jurisprudence that as the absence of an indispensable party goes to the jurisdiction of the court, an objection to the proceeding on that ground may be raised at any time during the hearing or on appeal from the decree of the trial court. The court may, of its own motion, for the like reason, raise and pass upon the objection, and if the ground of want of jurisdiction be not removed by bringing the proper parties on the record as parties to the proceedings the chancellor may dismiss the bill." In the case of Findley v. Warren 244 Pa. 64 Justice Mestrezat in an opinion decides: "We are of opinion that this decree should be vacated and the case be remanded that all the parties in interest may be made parties to the proceeding. The bill was filed by three of five remaindermen to restrain the defendants from the further taking of oil from the premises, for discovery as to the quantity of the oil taken by defendants, and for an accounting for the damages done to the interests of the plaintiffs. The premises were devised to the son of the testator for life with remainder to the son's five children. The life tenant leased the premises to the other defendants for oil purposes, and the oil was mined and removed under this lease. The learned court below in disposing of the case and entering a decree against the defendants found as a fact that the two remaindermen not joining in the proceedings 'recognized the existence of the lease made by their father' and as a conclusion of law they ratified the action of the life tenant in leasing the premises. The plaintiffs have assigned this action of the court for error. From his opinion, it appears that the learned chancellor regarded these findings as material to a proper disposition of the issues raised by the pleadings, and while it must be conceded that they would not affect the rights or interest of the two remaindermen not parties to the suit, yet the rights of the parties to this proceeding should not be adjudicated on such findings unless all parties in interest are bound by them. In an action by the two remaindermen the record in this suit would not conclude them from showing that they neither recognized nor ratified the action of their father in leasing the premises to the other defendants, and if the suit resulted in a decree for the plaintiffs, the record in the two cases would disclose contradictory findings of facts on which decrees were entered. Whether any or all of the remaindermen recognized, approved or ratified the lease made by the life tenant dres, in the opinion of the court, affect the defendants' liability to the plaintiffs in this bill, and if the question is to be determined it is apparent that all parties in interest should be plaintiffs or defendants to the proceedings." CONCLUSION. The complainants in this proceeding by the amended bill and the testimony and proofs offered at the hearing insist that by reason of the buildings restrictions in the title to the premises of Ada B. Sell and Minnie Ealer, as well as of the title of the defendant to his premises, the defendant, J. Harry Jones should be restrained from |