The courts may look to the history of the legislation upon the subject of which the statute treats, and the history of the times in which it was enacted, as well as the general history of the country, to determine the purpose that the Government sought to accomplish. (Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S., 457.)

In case of ambiguity in a statute contemporaneous and uniform executive construction is regarded as decisive. (Brown v. United States, 113 U. S., 568; also decisions cited by Attorney General in letter to Secretary of Treasury, Nov. 17, 1885, 31 Int. Rev. Rec., 382; Nunn v. Gerst Brewing Co., 99 Fed. Rep., 941.)

Where the language of a series of statutes is dubious, and open to different interpretations, the construction put upon them by the executive department charged with their execution has great and generally controlling force with the court. (St. Paul, Minneapolis, etc., Railway Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S., 528; see 19 Op. Atty. Gen., 177.) A construction of a doubtful or ambiguous statute by the executive department charged with the execution, in order to be binding upon the courts, must be long continued and unbroken. (Merritt v. Cameron, 137 U. S., 542.)

It is a rule well established that the construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing it will be given great weight by the courts if the true construction be doubtful (United States v. Hill, 120 U. S., 169, and cases cited, p. 182); but this rule has no application where the statute is not ambiguous or where it will not bear the interpretation put upon it by the executive officers. (Swift Company v. United States, 105 U. S., 691, 695; United States v. Graham, 110 U. S., 219; United States v. Tanner, 147 U. S., 661; United States v. Alger, 152 U. S., 384, 397.)

The same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional; and if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected. Unless it be impossible to avoid it, a general revenue statute should never be declared inoperative in all its parts because a particular part relating to a distinct subject may be invalid. (Field v. Clark (1892), 143 U. S., 649; 38 Int. Rev. Rec., 285.)

When an act of Congress is claimed to be unconstitutional, the presumption is in favor of its validity, and it is only when the question is free from any reasonable doubt that courts should hold an act in violation of that fundamental instrument upon which all the powers of the Government rest. (Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S., 509.)

TIME WHEN AN ACT TAKES EFFECT.

A law of Congress which contains no provision as to the time when it shall take effect commences and takes effect as a law from the moment it receives the approbation of the President. As a general rule, it is not competent to go into the division of a day. (30p. Atty. Gen., 82.)

For most purposes the law regards the entire day as an indivisible unit. But when the priority of one legal right over another, depending on the order of events occurring on the same day, is involved, this rule is necessarily departed from. (National Bank v. Burkhardt, 100 U. S., 686.)

In the absence of proof there is a presumption that an act was signed on the first minute of the day when it took effect, but it is competent to show by proof the exact time when the law was approved by the President, and when this is made to appear the law can only be given effect from that time. (Carriage Company v. Stengel, 37 Č. C. A., 210; 95 Fed. Rep., 637; Nunn v. William Gerst Brewing Co., 99 Fed. Rep., 939.)

The case of United States v. Iselin (87 Fed. Rep., 194) contains a very full discussion of the subject by the Board of General Appraisers. When necessary to determine conflicting rights courts of justice will take cognizance of the fractions of a day. (Louisville v. Savings Bank (1881), 104 U. S., 469.)

The act of March 3, 1875, took effect from the time it was approved and not at the commencement of the day. (Salmon v. Burgess, 97 U. S., 381; 25 Int. Rev. Rec., 31.)

When the act of August 28, 1894, went into effect. (Burr v. United States, 159 U. S., 78.)

The act of July 24, 1897, became a law only from the moment of its approval by the President, which was 6 minutes past 4 o'clock p. m. (Washington time) on July 24, 1897. (United States v. Iselin, 87 Fed. Rep., 194; United States v. Stoddard, 89 Fed. Rep., 699.) Affirmed by the United States circuit court of appeals (91 Fed. Rep., 1005; 34 C. C. A., 175). The Government, on the advice of the Attorney General, acquiesced in said decisions without seeking to prosecute any appeal to the United States Supreme Court. (T.D., 20627; T. D., 20700.)

The act of June 13, 1898, known as the "war-revenue act," took effect on the day next succeeding the day of its passage that is, on June 14, 1898, except as otherwise provided for. (Sec. 51.)

The act of April 12, 1902 (war-revenue repeal act), took effect July 1, 1902, except as otherwise specially provided for in section 10.

The act of August 5, 1909 (Payne-Aldrich tariff act), took effect, unless otherwise specially provided, on the day following its passage.

INTERNAL-REVENUE LEGISLATION.

The Revised Statutes were compiled under an act of June 27, 1866 (14 Stat., 74).

A list of acts respecting internal-revenue duties, from the first act (act of March 3, 1791) to April 28, 1828, is published in United States Statutes at Large, volume 1.

ACTS OF CONGRESS RELATING TO INTERNAL REVENUE ENACTED SINCE JULY 4, 1861.1

[Not including private acts, nor appropriation acts passed prior to the enactment of the Revised Statutes, June 22, 1874.]

REVISED STATUTES, TITLE XXXV, SECTIONS 3140-3465.

No reference can be had to the original statutes to control the construction of any section of the Revised Statutes when its meaning is plain, but where there is a substantial doubt as to the meaning of the language used in the revision the old law is a valuable source of information. (United States v. Bowen, 100 U. S., 508, 513; United States v. Lacher, 134 U. S., 624.)

In construing any part of the Revised Statutes it is admissible and often necessary to recur to its connection in the act of which it was originally a part. (United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S., 35.)

In case of ambiguous language in the Revised Statutes or uncertainty as to the true construction to be given to the words of any section, previous acts on the same subject may be referred to and examined for light on the object and intent of Congress as shown by the course of legislation, in the same manner as statutes in pari materia relating to the same subject may always be taken, compared, and construed together. (Wright v. United States, 15 Ct. Cls., 87. See also United States v. Claflin, 97 U. S., 546, and opinion of First Comptroller Porter in Kansas claim for 5 per cent net proceeds of public lands, 1 Lawrence Dec., 43.) No inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the title under which any particular section is placed. (Sec. 5600, R. ́S.)

An act to provide increased revenue from imports, to pay interest on the public debt, and for other purposes, approved August 5, 1861 (12 Stat., 292).

Direct tax and income. The act of March 2, 1891 (26 Stat., 822), authorized the return to the States of the direct tax collected.

An act to provide internal revenue to support the Government and to pay interest on the public debt, approved July 1, 1862 (12 Stat., 432).

Office of Internal Revenue created.

Income tax.-Under this act the tax was 3 per cent on incomes over $600 and not over $10,000; over $10,000, 5 per cent. Act of March 3, 1865, over $600 and not over $5,000, 5 per cent; over $5,000, 10 per cent on excess over $5,000. Act of March 2, 1867, over $1,000, 5 per cent. Act of July 14, 1870, over $2,000, 2 per cent. Income tax expired by limitation December 31, 1871. No income tax was collected under the act of June 30, 1864, as it was amended by the act of March 3, 1865, before it was collectible. 'Imposed tax on cotton.

On this date Congress convened in its first (extraordinary) session after the commencement of the War of the Rebellion, at which session was commenced the legislation which has since produced the present system of internal revenue taxation.

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