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our views are supported by men venerable as antiquity and learning can make them.

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In conclusion, it may be interesting for us to cite a few opinions on our authors. And first we have Dr. Johnson, who says, "Shakspere, with his excellencies, has likewise faults, and faults sufficient to obscure and overwhelm any other merit. He sacrifices virtue to convenience, and is so much more careful to please than to instruct, that he seems to write without any moral purpose. ... He makes no just distribution of good or evil, nor is always careful to show in the virtuous a disapprobation of the wicked. .... He had no regard to distinction of time or place, but gives to one age or nation, without scruple, the customs, iustitutions, and opinions of another, at the expense not only of likelihood but of possibility. . . . . In tragedy.... the effusions of passions which exigence forces out, are, for the most part, striking and energetic; but whenever he solicits his invention, or strains his faculties, the offspring of his throes is tumour, meanness, tediousness, and obscurity." Mrs. C. Lennox says, "The violation of poetical justice is not the only fault that arises from the death of Hamlet; . . . . his revenge becomes interested, and he seems to punish his uncle rather for his own death than the murder of the king his father. . . . The whole conduct of the play ('Cymbeline') is absurd and ridiculous to the last degree; ... his 'Winter's Tale' is greatly inferior to the old paltry story that furnished him with the subject of it." Respecting the poetic genius of Milton, Channing has many fine thoughts: we select at random:-"We would ask, in what age or country has the pastoral reed breathed such sweet strains as are borne to us on the oderiferous wings of gentle gales' from Milton's Paradise..... His numbers have the prime charm of expressiveness. They vary with, and answer to, the depth, or tenderness, or sublimity of his conceptions, and hold intimate alliance with the soul. Milton's poetry, though habitually serious, is always healthful, and bright, and vigorous. It has no gloom. He took no pleasure in drawing dark pictures of life for he knew

by experience that there is a power in the soul to transmute calamity into an occasion and nutriment of moral power and triumphant virtue. We find nowhere in his writings that whining sensibility and exaggeration of morbid feeling, which makes so much of modern poetry effeminizing." In "Characteristics of Men of Genius" we read: "As basis or fountain of his rare physical and intellectual accomplishments, the man Milton was just and devout. He is rightly dear to mankind, because in him--among so many perverse and partial men of genius,-in him humanity rights itself; the old eternal goodness finds a home in his breast, and for once shows itself beautiful. His gifts are subordinated to his moral sentiments; and his virtues are so graceful that they seem rather talents than labours. Among so many contrivances as the world has seen to make holiness ugly, in Milton, at least, it was so pure a flame, that the foremost impression his character makes is that of elegance."

We have not followed seriatim the remarks of our opponents through lack of courtesy or want of compliment to them. We have derived much pleasure ourselves from the course of reading and thought this debate has imposed upon us, and doubt not that they have done so likewise. We assure the reader our object has been to find the truth, and place it before him—our adjudicatorin an interesting manner; to vindicate the genius of our incomparable Milton from that slight which the tendencies of our age would cast upon his fair fame. The diluted translation of Germanisms has had a pernicious effect upon the standard of literary taste; but this fashion of thought having passed its culminating point, and the good sense of our countrymen having a practical tendency toward high moral sentiment, we may fairly expect, ere long, some gifted mind will give to the world a code of criticism and taste, in which the purity of gospel perfection will be acknowledged as the primary element of true genius. Then will Milton be placed on the pinnacle of fame by the acclamation of an admiring nation, who have drunk deep at the fount of his inspiration. L'OUVRIER.

In forming a judgment, lay your hearts void of foretaken opinions, else whatsoever is done or said will be measured by a wrong rule.-Sir P. Sidney.

Politics.

OUGHT THE LAW OF PRIMOGENITURE TO BE REPEALED?

AFFIRMATIVE REPLY.

WE have no faith in B. S. as a politician.ments purely on this ground. Were there The principle he lays down, in his negative nothing higher and diviner among men than article on this question, is one that demands feudalism, which was but the embodiment of and obtains our unqualified dissent. Had that ignoble principle that physical might our great reformers begun their respective is superior to moral and eternal right,religious or political reformations with B. S.'s were there no God-sent principles of truth, self-complaisance and primary principle of love, and universal benevolence,-were there action, they had now but figured indifferently no beauty and harmony in them,-in fact, among this world's benefactors. were there no Christianity in the world, to redeem humanity from the trammels of all error, we might, perhaps, be found contending in miserable fellowship with B. S. for the non-abolition of the primogenial law. But

B. S. does not trouble himself with the question of universal justice, which all law should express, or with man's inalienable and natural rights, which are at stake in this question; but passing over these weigh-believing, as we do, that the perfection of tier matters, begins the discussion of the merits of his political "anise and cummin." This is not likely to advance "the interests of truth in politics," B. S.'s avowed object.

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It is a great thing in religion and politics to see error, and recoil therefrom in the way of reform. Yea, is it not the first step towards improvement? B. S. seems not to admit this. "We must," says he, necessarily waive, or, at least, modify the claim, and content ourselves by enforcing on our opponents, that however cogent their arguments against primogeniture, it ought not and cannot be abolished, until an efficient substitute has been provided to replace it." The conclusion we deny not, but the spirit of self-isolation from the vital point at issue we execrate. Is not B. S. morally bound to state the nature of the law, good or bad, rather than waive our arguments, however cogent," or the claims of humanity, however divine? From such a sentence, is it not manifest, that if all the members of the British commonwealth were to follow B. S.'s principle out, that "an efficient substitute" would never be found, simply and justly because never sought. Such "resting upon their (B. S.'s) arms," we think, considering the question of national good, worthy of comparison only to the apostate contentment of ancient Israel, that called forth the prophetic "Woe!" B. S. defends the "law;" waives or modifies the most cogent argu

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all human law consists in the embodying of heaven's own principle, as it regards one another, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," we seek not "to rest on our arms," while the opposite principle "forms part of the very framework of society," so fully manifest in primogeniture, and transportation at home, or slavery abroad.

We deem it rather our duty to expose the fallacy in fundamentis of the first, and the folly of its defenders,-to point out its evil tendencies and results in our great social fabric; thereby to arouse our countrymen to acquiesce no longer in its existence, but, by sanctified exertion under heaven's given plaz, to seek its erasure from our great and glori ous national code, fully convinced that all history teaches that the abandonment of error is the first step towards finding the truth: that as the gloom of the one breaks, the radiance of the other dawns. To be brief, B. S. proceeds, with no small parade, to offer, as an opening negative article, "a slight defence" a slight one indeed!-at which we are amazed the more, as proceeding from “*so able a correspondent." B. S. forcibly brought to our recollection one of the great Foster's remarks, in his essays, we think as applica ble to primogeniture and B. S., as to episcopacy and H. B. It was to the effect that some minds invest that which has antiquity on its side with a peculiar corresponding

sanctity. The absurdity of such illogical deductions we need not here expose. Hence B. S. calls primogeniture "a time-honoured institution, interwoven with the habits and affections of society." If we are to understand by “honoured," established merely; by "habits and affections," evil habits and depraved affections, B. S. is right, not otherwise. Such honour, however, is not worth parade, or such habits worthy of continuance, such affections worth cultivation, but vice versa. The result of this advocacy comes rather unexpectedly by way of admission, that primogeniture is not a good institution, to calling it an evil one, morally and essentially, as there can be no neutral ground for it to stand upon. This "slight defence" begins with flagrant sophistry, and, if we are to follow out his own deductions, ends in gross absurdity. We would remind B. S. that his arguments are much the same, not one iota superior to those which have been advanced in favour of slavery, episcopacy, or popery; or that the same might have been, and doubtless were, used against the abolition of Suttee, or Hindoo infanticide; and that the weakness of his arguments is highly indicative of the defencelessness of his cause. B. S. denominates those who advocate the abolition of the law "extreme politicians,"'-a term indefinite indeed! Did he mean red republicans or chartists? We like plain writing, but in the absence of that we must understand the appellation comparatively. Let us see. Some politicians go so far as to prove a given institution "not good," and straightway set about a "slight defence" to perpetuate its evil existence: this is one extreme. Other politicians, however, having shown the given institution to be radically wrong, straightway advocate its abolition to the best of their powers: this is another extreme. While we are sorry to find B. S. in the one, we may congratulate ourselves on being in the other, as the most consistent, and conclude that the greater the distance between us on this subject the better for our honour in the unmistakable meaning of the word.

B. S.'s next step is to impress on his readers that a great change in our laws would create a great national excitement. Every reader of history must know this to his content. Whenever truth enters the

dominions of error, we expect victory for the former, but never without a previous struggle. What! and if in such a glorious worldredemptive movement, a nation should tremble convulsed in the very heart of it, or the powers of darkness recoil for ever, is the advocate of divine truth to cease his advocacy, or the proclaimer of universal justice towards universal man to retire? yea, more, are both to say, We have come to the crisis, and now we will turn renegade, desert our posts, abandon our arms, because we fear the Divinity in truth and justice intends to make fallen man tremble? Verily, no, B. S.! We have a strong faith in but one conservatism, that of truth and justice, for we know that these shall hereafter knit together all nations in a glorious brotherhood: whereas, the conservatism that pervades this article, and sits enthroned among "a titled aristocracy," admits only just enough of these divine principles to excite ceaseless antagonism.

We have not space to answer B. S. on "the right of property," it is somewhat foreign to the point at issue-the disposal of individual possession by law. Does B. S. presume so on our ignorance, or glory in his own, as to think we shall acquiesce in his assertion that "primogeniture is only a custom, not a law." Is there no law in our code to the effect that the property of an intestate shall descend to his eldest son and heirs? Is there no law of primogeniture? Are not the terms of the debate, "Ought the Law of Primogeniture to be repealed?" B. S. has discovered that there is no law at all, "only a custom" at every one's disposal. We should have thought that any writer in the British Controversialist had sufficient confidence in the editors to distrust themselves, rather than to question the terms of debate, much more than to dogmatize upon them. If we are to decide how far B. S. is worthy of the compliment paid him by "Irene," as a "man learned in the law," we fear the real merit would excite laughter instead of eclat. The political digressions which characterize this slight defence," "Irene" has taken up in his article.

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The remaining space of our reply we devote to T. U.'s article. Here we meet a similar defect to that which is so manifest in B. S.'s article-an attempt to avoid the vital point involved. T. U. says, "It is idle to maintain that the law of primogeniture is

unjust or arbitrary in character, as such an objection might be applied with much greater force to the whole question of the right of the present proprietors to the ownership of the land.". It were just as logical to assert the equity of slavery, on the ground of the justice or injustice of transportation.

If it is idle to maintain that that which is essentially unjust, is unjust, or arbitrary, is arbitrary, because anything else may be so, we shall soon cease to believe that our legislature is progressive. The right of proprietorship to which T. U. refers, is nothing to the point, or we might vindicate our belief, that as it regards the soil on which we tread, no man has a right to more than he can and will cultivate well. Wherever we find either waste land, or badly cultivated land, we have the primary principle of national decay at work. If primogeniture be unjust and arbitrary, which we hold true, it cannot be idle, it must be right and expedient to maintain the same without abatement, till it cease to be. For what is the object of law but to establish universal justice. When it fails of this, it is a negation of itself. With such a flippant comment as T. U. makes on the vital point in the opening of his article, the reader is quite prepared for what follows, as no one would expect a house to abide a storm, or the depredations of time, whose foundation was laid in the sand. He manifests the same horror at a great change as B. S., and concludes that were the law of primogeniture repealed, our great political institution must soon subside in darkness and chaos! It were idle indeed here to show that there is no possible connexion between the repeal of a bad law and fiendish revolutions. We would remind T. U. that the terrible French revolutions did not arise from repealing a bad law-quite otherwise,

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from the oppression of bad laws and tyranny. To repeal a bad law is to vindicate truth and supreme justice-is indeed a great and good work, and "men do not gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles."

Again: TU. asks, in order to justify the law, "What claim have children upon a father other than that they may be maintained in infancy, properly educated, and placed in the way of supporting themselves through life?" If T. U. believes this much at heart, we may say he is better than his creed, and cannot therewith consistently hold his position. Is he not aware that the law of primogeniture stands opposed to this, and does not admit a claim so natural? If it did in the case of a father intestate, it would make some provision for the infancy, the education, and establishment in life, of the junior branches of the family. Surely the moral obligation involved is not to be disregarded. In the case supposed, the law evidently acts for the father; but morally considered, had it not ought to act as a father? According to T. U.'s definition of the children's claim on the father, the law is evidently unjust and partial, since it negatives the claim, or acts as though it had never existed. Thus have we shown from our opponent's assertion or admission of the essential point involved, that the existing law of primogeniture is the embodiment of injustice; and what greater argument, we may ask, can be adduced in favour of its abolition?

In conclusion, we may truly say, if B. S. and T. U. have advanced the best arguments in favour of primogeniture, we may pronounce it a fallen cause, and rest assured it only needs the continued advocacy of its repeal by those who love their nation, to secure its ultimate and total abolition. Buckingham.

NEGATIVE REPLY.

ROLLA.

I оrGHT to be truly grateful to " Irene"! | English constitution, while "honest indusThat gentleman having discovered that my try" kneels, with "a millstone of debt about former article on this topic (pp. 385-387) her neck," weeping my untimely fate. was an act of argumentative suicide, has Surely both friend and foe must envy me, buried me with funereal honours outvy- and exclaiming all precedent. The army and navy of my country have been sacrificed as mighty hecatombs to appease my manes; and my mausoleum is "a starry-pointing pyramid" formed of the magnificent ruins of the

"Thou, so sepulchred, in such pomp dost lie, That kings, for such a tomb, might wish to die." Feeling, however, an uneasy sense of vitality, and doubting whether "Irene" has really

now

been as destructive as he intended to be, I"might" and "right;" two singular conclushall now proceed to examine the arguments sions for a radical politician, and somewhat urged against primogeniture; but I wish it difficult to reconcile with history. Can any to be understood that I do so under protest, confidence be placed in a writer, or any and as a mere act of courtesy towards my weight be attached to his arguments, when opponents. For reasons already stated at they are based on such suicidal puerilities? page 385 (to which I beg to refer the reader), I maintain that the present question is now settled in the negative. No substitute for our present law of inheritance has been proposed; and since it is utterly impossible that civilized society can be carried on, if the obsequies of every person who dies intestate are to be celebrated by a physical-force fight for the possession of his property, the law of primogeniture (which simply directs that, in such cases, real estate shall devolve upon the eldest son, to the exclusion of all others) must remain unrepealed. In parliamentary phraseology there is "no motion before the house;" cadit quæstio, the debate is at an end, and we are now simply engaged in a postprandial discussion in the refreshment room. As space is valuable, I shall occasionally comment rather by allusion than quotation, hoping that my readers will refer to my opponents' articles to see that I do no injustice. To facilitate this, I shall add numerical references to the portions criticised. My old friend "Rolla" claims my first attention. As he appears to be no great friend to conservative politics, I was somewhat astonished to find him declaring (p. 384, col. 1) that primogeniture was, "in its origin, an encroachment on the leading power;" while in the next column we are informed that "having learned the origin of the law, the reader will not be surprised that it should be unjust in se"! An encroachment on the leading power is unjust in se! This is a revival of the old doctrines of passive obedience and the divine right of despotism, twin spectres of the past, at whose apparition in the pages of the Controversialist I beg to express my unfeigned "surprise." Again, on the same page, we are told (col. 1) that primogeniture is "the democratic element overwhelming the monarchic power in a rude state of society;" and (col. 2) that it is "the embodiment of the principle which always prevails more or less in a rude state of society-that right is subordinate to might." Whence it appears, that in a rude state of society the democratic element and monarchic power are, respectively, the personification of

Having lighted my critical lantern, invite the reader to turn to page 384, and (passing over the introductory dissertation on feudalism) to accompany me, from the top of col. 2, in a rigorous search after a valid and honest argument against primogeniture. The first argument brought forward is contained in these words," Equality of birth implies equality in succession, according to the simple dictate of natural right." For" equality" read “priority," and the sentence will prove as potent logic in favour of primogeniture: the argument is an imposture. I must renew my search. As the next paragraph simply expresses "Rolla's" surprise at the long career of primogeniture, and his opinions on " transportation, execution, &c.," I pass on to the lengthy and singularly-constructed sentence which follows it. Instead of the law granting the injustice of primogeniture, by limiting "it in one portion of the kingdom," &c., the truth is identically the opposite; gavel-kind (the custom described by "Rolla") was an institution of our Saxon ancestors, and the law limited it by introducing primogeniture throughout the kingdom, except in Kent, where it either could not or dare not. If "Rolla's" inference be worth anything, it is in favour of primogeniture. I, however, respectfully decline encumbering myself with such sophistica tions. The statement that "there is no right of primogeniture among females, the crown excepted," is incorrect; the eldest daughter has a right to include the principal family mansion in her share.* With respect to the assertion quoted from Maunder, I may inform "Rolla" that it applies only to France. The hereditary succession to the crown of England has been governed by the law of primogeniture ever since A.D. 800, when the heptarchy was united under the sway of Egbert.

"II. It is a law repugnant to natural feeling," &c. Shade of Wilberforce! trem

* I may here remark, that this objection as to females applies to all known laws of inheritance;

females never inherit, except in default of male issue, an event naturally of rare occurrence.

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