declares all combinations whose object is to destroy or impede free competition between the several lines of business engaged in utterly void. The combination or agreement, whether or not in the particular instance it has the desired effect, is void. The vice is in the combination or agreement. The practical evil effect of the combination only demonstrates its character; but, if its object is to prevent or impede free and fair competition in trade, and may in fact have that tendency, it is void, as being against public policy. For the foregoing reasons the agreement is against public policy. and is therefore void. The judgment is affirmed. MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT. PPEAL by defendant from an order of the A District Court for Brown County denying his motion for a new trial in an action to recover the contract price for a well auger and appliances which had been sold and delivered to him, in which a verdict, had been directed for plaintiffs. Affirmed. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion. Mr. J. M. Thompson, for appellant: Plaintiffs' letters in effect said that the fifteeninch auger, to do good work, need not necessarily be placed in the hands of experienced men, but could be used by men of ordinary ability, and need not be used in some particular kind of soil, but would do work in any ordinary soil of the country; that wherein plaintiffs say the larger augers proved unsatisfactory the one in question "would answer all purposes. This amounts to an express warranty, and the question should have been left to the jury. McClintock v. Emick, 87 Ky. 160; Warder v. Bowen, 31 Minn. 335; Tuttle v. Brown, 4 Gray, 457; Benj. Sales, 3d ed. § 613, notes K, M. The auger was manufactured for the identical *Head notes by MITCHELL, J. NOTE.-Sale by manufacturer, implied warranty. Where a manufacturer contracts to supply an article to be applied to a particular use, the buyer trusts to the manufacturer and relies on his judgment, and not upon his own; and there is an implied warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the intended use. Brown v. Edgington, 2 Man. & Gr. 279; Jones v. Bright, 5 Bing. 533; Randall v. Newson, L. R. 2 Q. B. Div. 102; Johnson v. Raylton, L. R. 7 Q. B. Div. 438. But where a known described and defined article is ordered, though for a particular purpose, if it be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall purpose for which it was sold, and by the defendant ordered for the precise use intended by plaintiffs, and for which it was made, and the law would imply a warranty of fitness. Cosgrove v. Bennett, 32 Minn. 371; Harris v. Waite, 51 Vt. 481, 31 Am. Rep. 694; Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 48 Ark. 325; Shatto v. Abernethy, 35 Minn. 538, 539; Best v. Flint, 2 New Eng. Rep. 604, 58 Vt. 543; 5 Wait, Act. and Def. 562, 565 and cases cited; 8 Wait, Act. and Def. 362, 459. See Weber v. Demuth, 24 N. Y. S. R. 286; Snow v. Schomacker Mfg. Co. 69 Ala. 111, 44 Am. Rep. 509; Poland v. Miller, 95 Ind. 387; Bird v. Mayer, 8 Wis. 362; 2 Benj. Sales, 3d ed. §§ 645, 656, 657, 661; Getty v. Rountree, 2 Pinn. 379; French v. Vining, 102 Mass. 132, 135; Fogg v. Rodgers, 84 Ky. 558; Mason v. Chappell, 15 Gratt. 572; Parsons, Cont. 6th ed. 586, note a; Beals v. Panstead, 24 Vt. 114; Morehouse v. Comstock, 42 Wis. 626; Rodgers v. Niles, 11 Ohio St. 48; Byers v. Chapin, 28 Ohio St. 300; Leopold v. Van Kirk, 27 Wis. 152; Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wis. 626; Dawes v. Peebles, 6 Fed. Rep. 856; Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552, 562; Gerst v. Jones, 32 Gratt. 524; Park v. Morris Axe & Tool Co. 4 Lans. 103; Murray v. Smith, 4 Daly, 277; Hoult v. Baldwin, 67 Cal. 610; Phila. & R. Coal & Iron Co. v. Hoffman (Pa.) 1 Cent. Rep. 927; Best v. Flint, 2 New Eng. Rep. 604, 58 Vt. 543; Beers v. Williams, 16 Iйl. 69; Archdale v. Moore, 19 Ill. 565; Van Wyck v. Allen, 69 N. Y. 61. Messrs. Lind & Hagberg and George W. Somerville, for respondent: Where the contract is in writing, and there is no express warranty, no warranty will be implied. Getty v. Rountree, 2 Chand. (Wis.) 28; Moore v. McKinlay, 5 Cal. 471; Benj. Sales, p. 577, art. 621. In this case the property purchased is specifically defined; and in such case no warranty is implied though the vendor knew that the ven answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer. Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288. Where the article ordered was to be of a particular design or pattern, well defined and understood between the parties, and the article delivered conforms to the pattern or design, there is no warranty implied further than that it shall be of good workmanship and material. Cunningham v. Hall, 4 Allen, 274; Mason v. Chappell, 15 Gratt. 586; Prideaux v. Bunnett, 1 C. B. N. S. 613. See Miller v. Moore, ante, 374. Conditional sale; implied warranty that thing sold will be satisfactory. See note to Campbell Printing Press Co. v. Thorp (Mich.) 1 L. R. A. 645, 36 Fed. Rep. 414. dee intended to use the property for a particu- | hole, in a few days. To this defendant replied lar purpose. Thompson v. Libby, 35 Minn. 443. When there is a sale of a defined article specifically described, and capable of being ascertained by either party, there is no implied warranty. Williams v. Ingram, 21 Tex. 300; Hill v. North, 34 Vt. 604. Benjamin in his work on Sales (vol.2,4th Am. ed. pp.864, 987) lays down the correct rule: That when a known, described, and defined article is ordered from a manufacturer, although it is stated to be required by the purchaser for a particular purpose, still, if the known, defined and described thing be actually supplied, there is no warranty that it shall answer the particular purpose intended by the buyer. by telegram, ordering a fifteen auger, to make a twenty-inch hole, which order plaintiffs filled, and sent him the machine. The communications between the parties were all by letter or telegram. When sued for the purchase price, the defense was that the auger outfit was warranted to be suitable for, and would perform, the work, and would answer the purpose for which it was made, to wit, boring wells; that in fact it was not suitable for and would not perform such work or answer such purpose. It is not claimed but that, so far as the plan and make of the outfit are concerned, defendant got just what he ordered; but the complaint is that it did not and would not reasonably answer the purpose for which it was designed. There is certainly no express warranty con See Cosgrove v. Bennett, 32 Minn. 371; Thomp-tained either in the catalogue or the correspondson v. Libby, supra; Ollivant v. Bayley, 5 Q. B. 288; Hoe v. Sanborn, 21 N. Y. 552-563; Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 Mees. & W. 399; Tilton Safe Co. v. Tisdale, 48 Vt. 83. Mitchell, J., delivered the opinion of the court: once between the parties, all that was anywhere said about the kind of material the auger was designed to work in, or the proper size, etc., being evidently merely precautionary or advisory. It is claimed, however, that there was, under the circumstances, an implied warIranty that the article was reasonably fit for the use or purpose for which it was made and intended to be used, to wit, boring wells. As the contract was in writing, no warranty not expressed or implied by its terms can be added, either by implication of law or by parol proof. Whitmore v. South Boston Iron Co. 2 Allen, 52. As to when there is and when there is not an implied warranty that an article ordered from a manufacturer or dealer shall be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made or designed to be used is a question upon which much has been said and written. As to the general rule applicable to the question, all the leading authorities are substantially agreed, although they state it somewhat differently and are not always agreed in the application of it to the particular facts of a given cause. The plaintiffs were manufacturers of and dealers in an earth-boring auger and appurtenances, known as the "Challenge Auger Outfit," of which they had published and circulated descriptive catalogues, one of which they sent to defendant. This catalogue contained cuts or models of the outfit when put up and at work, and of the auger, and enumerated the various tools, etc., of which a full outfit consisted, which were stated to include "everything needed to bore a well, except wood-work for a derrick." It also gave the prices of different sized augers up to twenty inches, and stated that plaintiffs could make to order larger sizes, if desired, but that they did not advise this, since a smaller one would answer all purposes, and that when it is required to make a large hole it was better to use a reamer. The As stated in 2 Benjamin on Sales, $$ 987, catalogue further stated: "These augers have 988, the rule is: "Where a manufacturer or a been on the market too long, and are too well dealer contracts to supply an article which he known to need any lengthy explanation or manufactures or produces, or in which he deals, guaranty on our part. We would simply say to be applied to a particular purpose, so that that our auger is designed to work in soft ma- the buyer necessarily trusts to the judgment or terial only, and for a low-priced auger outfit skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is, in the Challenge is equal to any." From this that case, an implied term of warranty that it catalogue defendant ordered a twenty-four inch shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which auger, to which plaintiffs replied, saying that it is to be applied. But when a known, they would not recommend as large an auger described and defined article is ordered of a as that, as they thought a fifteen-inch was am- manufacturer, although it is stated to be reply large enough. To this defendant replied, quired by the purchaser for a particular purordering a twenty-inch auger outfit complete, pose, still, if the known, defined and described with reamer to make a thirty-inch hole. In thing be actually supplied, there is no warranty response to this, plaintiffs replied, saying that that it shall answer the particular purpose inthey had so little call for augers over fifteen-tended by the buyer,”-in short, that there is no inch diameter that they did not carry them in implied warranty, where the buyer gets what stock; that the larger-sized augers, unless in he bargains for, though it does not answer his the hands of a man of considerable experience purpose. and in a country to which they are particularly In Leake, on Contracts, 404, the same rule adapted, were generally very unsatisfactory; is stated thus: "If an order be given for the that they worked unnecessarily heavy and slow; manufacture or supply of an article to satisfy and that an auger fifteen inches or less an- a required purpose, that purpose, and not any swered all purposes; that they could not fill specific article, being the essential matter of the order for a twenty-inch auger for some the contract, the seller is then bound, as a contime, and did not consider it advisable to make dition of the contract, to supply an article reaa reamer for a twenty auger for a thirty hole; sonably fit for the purpose, and is considered that they could send defendant a fifteen-auger as warranting that it is so. "But if an order outfit complete, with reamer to make a twenty be given for a specific article of a recognized kind or description, and the article is | the rule. This court has announced and ap- In 1 Parsons on Contracts, 586, 587, the rule is stated thus: "If a thing be ordered of a manufacturer for a special purpose, and it be supplied and sold for that purpose, there is an implied warranty that it is fit for that purpose. This principle must be limited to the cases where a thing is ordered for a special purpose, and not applied to those where a special thing is ordered, though this be intended for a special purpose." Of the authors quoted, Leake is perhaps the most fortunate and clear in the statement of WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT. STATE OF WISCONSIN, ex rel. John R. | him appointing drainage commissioners under BALTZELL, v. Alva STEWART, Circuit Judge. (74 Wis. 620.) 1. An Act creating a board of drainage commissioners with certain corporate powers for the purpose of promoting the public health and welfare, in the drainage and reclamation of a certain district, although a special Act, is not within the inhibition of Const., art. 4, § 31, subd. 7, against special or private laws giving corporate powers or franchises except to cities, as it falls within the police power. 2. The Legislature may delegate to an officer or corporation the right to determine the necessity of the exercise of the power of em inent domain. 4. Granting power to drainage commissioners to determine what land will be benefited by the proposed drainage and shall be assessed therefor, where the locality is specified and the nature and extent of the proposed drainage are clearly indicated by the statute, is not an unlawful delegation of power. 5. Giving an appeal from the decisions of drainage commissioners in classifying lands for assessment, and fixing amounts of dam the provisions of chap. 383, Laws of 1889. Affirmed. Chapter 383 of the Laws of 1889 is entitled "An Act to Amend Chapter 442 of the Laws of 1885, Entitled 'An Act to Provide for Drainage and Reclamation of Certain Lands in Dane County."" Section 1 provides that when twenty-five or more owners of wet or overflowed lands, which in their opinion will be benefited by the system of drainage, and who shall be of the opinion that the public health or welfare will be promoted thereby, shall desire to institute proceedings for the drainage or reclamation of lands, they may apply to the court or judge thereof, by petition, for the institution of such proceedings, and the appointment of three commissioners to be known as "Drainage Commissioners of Drainage District Number 1 of Dane County;" and after giving four weeks' notice, "the court or presiding judge shall make an order appointing three disinterested and competent freeholders as commissioners, and then and there fix the time and place for their first meeting. Section 3 provides for the report of an engineer, and then, after due notice, "after hearing the parties interested, who shall appear, the commissioners shall decide upon said petition, and if they shall be of the opinion that the public health or welfare will be thereby promoted, and shall decide favorably upon the intended work, they shall make an order therefor." Section 4 provides for making an agreement as to damages for removal of dams, water ages and benefits as well as on every other ques-powers, etc., and for an award of damages to tion except the necessity of drainage, provides due process of law. every owner of lands taken not so agreed on within thirty days. Section 5 provides for a basis of benefit for a levy of taxes such as may be necessary "for the lawful and proper purposes of the drainage district." such classification to a special jury. Section 11 provides for an appeal to a special jury on the question of damages and also for an appeal therefrom to the Circuit Court for Dane County, where it is to be tried as an action, subject to all rules pertaining to such. Section 21 permits the commissioners to au 1 246. thorize employés to go upon lands lying in the | McCarthy v. Com. 1 Cent. Rep. 111, 110 Pa. district for the purposes of the improvement, etc., and "may ever thereafter enter upon said lands as aforesaid for the purpose of maintaining or repairing such work." Under this Act a petition was duly presented to respondent signed by the required number of freeholders of Dane County asking for the appointment of commissioners under the provisions of the Act, and such proceedings taken as culminated in the appointment of the commissioners; and this proceeding was thereupon taken for the purpose of reversing and setting aside such appointment. The further facts appear in the opinion. Messrs. S. U. Pinney and A. L. Sanborn, for relator: This Act is one granting corporate powers and privileges, and as such is prohibited by the Amendment to the Constitution of Wisconsin | of 1871, art. 4, § 31, subd. 7, which prohibits the Legislature from enacting any special or private law for granting corporate powers or privileges, except to cities. Atkinson v. Marietta & C. R. Co. 15 Ohio St. 21; State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; Clegg v. School Dist. No. 56, 8 Neb. 178; School Dist. No. 56 v. St. Joseph F. & M. Ins. Co. 103 U. S. 707 (26 L. ed. 601); San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493. No particular form of words is necessary to create a corporation. United States v. Babbit, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 61 (17 L. ed. 96), and cases cited; Gelpcke v. Dur buque, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 221 (17 L. ed. 519); Wood County v. Lackawanna Iron & Coal Co. 93 U. S. 624 (23 L. ed. 991). A corporation may be created by implication. Ang. & A. Corp. § 76 et seq.; Rex v. Amery, 1 T. R. 575; Ex parte Newport Marsh Trustees, 16 Sim. 346, 349; Mahony v. State Bank,4 Ark. 620; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406. The character of an association does not depend upon the name by which it is called. The question is, Has it the attributes of a corporation? If so, it is, in the nature of things, a corporation. Thomas v. Dakin, 22 Wend. 9, 69, 81; Liverpool & L. L. & F. Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 77 U. S. 10 Wall. 566 (19 L. ed. 1029); Oliver v. Liverpool & L. L. & F. Ins. Co. 100 Mass. 531; People v. Watertown Assessors, 1 Hill, 620; Ex parte Newport Marsh Trustees, supra; Conservators of River Tone v. Ash, 10 Barn. & C. 349. The grant of corporate powers by special acts, to all persons, whether natural or artificial, other than cities, is forbidden. See Atkinson v. Marietta & C. R. Co. 15 Ohio St. 21; State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; Clegg v. School Dist. No. 56, 8 Neb. 178; School Dist. No. 56 v. St. Joseph F. & M. Ins. Co. and San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, supra. The mischiefs aimed at by this amendment could be evaded by creating quasi corporations or corporations sub modo, whether of a public or private character. Ang. & A. Corp. 11th ed. §§ 23-25. As to what are general and what are public, local or special laws, see State v. Laen, 9 Wis. 285, 295, 296; Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 177, 181, 191-194; Evans v. Phillippi, 9 Cent. Rep. 691, 117 Pa. 237; A local or special statute is limited in the objects to which it applies. People v. Wright, 70 Ill. 389, 399. A statute which relates to persons or things as a class is a general law, while a statute which relates to particular persons or things of a class is special. Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa. 350; Scrantom v. Silkman, 4 Cent. Rep. 317, 113 Pa. 191, 199; Davis v. Clark, 106 Pa. 377, 334; Morrison v. Bachert, 3 Cent. Rep. 117, 112 Pa. 328330; Scowden's App. 96 Pa. 422, 425; Com. v. Patton, 88 Pa. 258. The Act is unconstitutional in that it attempts to delegate to the commissioners the power to define and determine the boundaries of the drainage district. This power is essentially a legislative one and one which could not be delegated. See People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 625; Cooley, Const. Lim. §§ 121, 122, and cases cited. It is not competent for the Legislature to delegate the power of determining whether any exigency exists for the exercise of this extraordinary power, so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts to review and set aside their proceedings. Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 469, 473; Re Ryers, 72 N. Y. 7, 8; Reeves v. Wood Co. Treas urer, 8 Ohio St. 333; Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio St. 349. The law will not allow the right of property or business to be invaded under the guise of a police regulation for the benefit of the public health or good order, when it is manifest that such is not the object or purpose of the enactment. Chaddock v. Day (Mich.) 4 L. R. A. 809. No action under this Act, which is shown to have any other object than to maintain the public health or welfare, can be sustained under our Constitution. Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. 70 Ill. 191. Without an opportunity to parties interested to have the benefit of due process of law the entire Act is unconstitutional and void. As to what is due process of law, seeWestervelt v. Gregg, 12 N. Y. 209; Cooley, Const. L. 355; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 Ů. S. 97, 104, 105 (24 L. ed. 616, 620); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535 (28 L. ed. 232, 238); Citizens Sav. & Loan Asso. v. Topeka, 87 U. S. 20 Wall. 662 (22 L. ed. 461); Durkee v. Janesville, 28 Wis. 464; Hincks v. Milwaukee, 46 Wis. 566. Messrs. Luse & Wait filed a brief on behalf of the Stoughton Mill Company. Mr. H. W. Chynoweth, with Messrs. Rogers & Hall, for respondent: The clause of the Constitution in question is but a prohibition on the grant to private corporations,-those organized and carried on purely for the purpose of advancing private ends or for private gain. Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210; Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590; Chicago & N. W. R. Co v. Langlade Co. Id. 614; Dowlan v. Sibley Co. 36 Minn. 430. In its general features the law in question is not unlike chapter 442, Laws of 1885, pro nounced a valid enactment by this court in Bryant v. Robbins, 70 Wis. 258. This Act does not confer corporate powers or privileges in the sense intended in the Amendment to the Constitution. We can admit, for the purposes of this Act, that as to its corporate characteristics the creature is not unlike a town. In Norton v. Peck, 3 Wis. 714, it is decided that a town is not a corporation, and towns are in that case denominated as quasi corporations or corporations sub modo only. See also Eaton v. Manitowoc Co. 44 Wis. 493; Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590; Pulaski Co. v. Reere, 42 Ark. 54; Beach v. Leahy, 11 Kan. 23; Soper v. Henry Co. 26 Iowa, 264; Morey v. Newfane, 8 Barb. 645; Sussex Co. v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108; Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247; Hedges v. Madison Co. 6 Ill. 567; State v. Paionee Co. 12 Kan. 426; Pottawatomie County v. O'Sullivan, 17 Kan. 58; Norton Co. v. Shoemaker, 27 Kan. 77; Knowles v. Topeka Board of Education, 33 Kan. 692; Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109; State v. Cincinnati, 20 Ohio St. 18; State v. Shearer, 46 Ohio St. 275; State v. Covington, 29 Ohio St. 102; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St. 14; Woods v. Colfax Co. 10 Neb. 552; Sherman Co. v. Simonds, 109 U. S. 735 (27 L. ed. 1093); State v. Wilson, 12 Lea, 246; Sauk Centre Board of Education v. Moore, 17 Minn. 412; Re Woolsey, 95 N. Y. 135. This Act directs and imposes the perform. ance of a duty, the discharge of an obligation due to the State. It requires the abatement and destruction of a nuisance. No adjudication holds that any constitutional provis. ion ever enacted restricts the Legislature or in the least limits or controls its power to make such a requirement or to impose such a duty on the people of any given locality within the territorial limits of the State. People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376; Burch v. Hardwicke, 30 Gratt. 24; State v. Hunter, 38 Kan. 578; Potter's Dwarris, Stat. § 452; People v. Shepard, 36 N. Y. 286; Coe v. Schultz, 47 Barb. 64; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461. This Act is neither private nor special. It is both public and general. Cathcart v. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590; Phillips v. Albany, 28 Wis, 340; Zitske v. Goldberg, 38 Wis. 233, and cases there cited; State v. Baltimore Co. 29 Md. 516; Harrison v. Stickney, 2 H. L. Cas. 108. The Act is not void as an attempt to interfere with private property and private rights contrary to the law of the land and contrary to the Constitutions of the State of Wisconsin and of the United States. to prescribe that these commissioners might levy the assessments as the Act in question provides. Foster v. Wood Co. 9 Ohio St. 540. Cole, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is a proceeding to reverse and set aside an order of the Circuit Judge of Dane County appointing three drainage commissioners, under chap. 383, Laws 1889. The validity of this Act is challenged on several grounds. In the first place it is insisted that the Act is void because in conflict with subdivision 7, § 31, art. 4, of the Constitution, which prohibits the Legislature from enacting any special or private law granting corporate powers or privileges except to cities. That chapter 383 is a special Act, as distinguished from a general law, it seems to me there can be no doubt. In State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279, and in some subsequent cases, the words "general law" received a very liberal interpretation,—one sufficiently broad to comprehend what some authorities denominate "Public Local Laws;" but unless all distinction between a general law and a special law is broken down, I can but think the law in question is a special Act. It is entitled "An Act to Amend an Act to Provide for the Drainage and Reclamation of Certain Lands in Dane County," and in its terms applies mainly to lands in that county. I must therefore consider it a special Act, intended to accomplish or carry out a local system of drainage. That the Act grants certain corporate powers it seems to me equally plain. Whether those powers are the corporate powers and privileges the amendment of 1871 was intended to prohibit the Legislature from granting by a special Act is a question which will be considered in a moment; but now, without going into an analysis of the provisions of the Act, it is sufficient to remark that the law clearly grants certain corporate powers and privileges, within the meaning of many wellconsidered cases to which our attention was called on the argument. The law declares that the commissioners shall be known as "drainage commissioners of drainage district Number 1 of Dane County." They are to take an oath, and give bonds for the faithful performance of their duties; cause accurate surveys to be made of the route of the proposed system of drainage. After hearing parties interested, the board decides whether, in their opinion, the public health or welfare will be promoted by the intended work; if so, they classify lands for the assessment of benefits and taxes to execute the same, assess such benefits and taxes, make contracts, incur obligations, sue and enforce the collection of delinquent assessments, and exercise other cor Donnelly v. Decker, supra; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606 (29 L. ed. 229); Tide- Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; Hagar v. Rec-porate powers. They exercise many.powers lamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U. S. 701 (28 L. ed. 569); Fries v. Brier, 9 West. Rep. 260, 111 Ind. 65; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378, 34 Am. Rep. 451: Mills v. Charleton, 29 Wis. 401; Cooley, Taxn. chap. 20; Chicago v. Larned, 34 Ill. 203; Harward v. St. Clair & M. L. Drainage Co. 51 Ill. 130; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406; Hagar v. Yolo Co. 47 Cal. 222; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370. It is perfectly competent for the Legislature of regular corporate bodies, and the Act seems to constitute the drainage commissioners a corporation to accomplish and carry out the work of the proposed system of drainage. But the counsel for the respondent insist and claim that, even if the Act does grant certain corporate powers, they are not of that nature and character which it was the intent of the amendment to prohibit the Legislature from granting by a special Act. It is said the drain |