XII. be so; and when my Ministers become Radicals, I may CHAP. be excused if, on my side, I become an ultra-Royalist.' 1823. The Duke of Wellington, at the same period, thus expressed himself at the Foreign Office, when the chance of a parliamentary majority on the question of war was under discussion with Lord Liverpool and Mr Canning: "I am not so au fait of parliamentary majorities as my colleagues, but I know Spain better than them. Advance without delay, without hesitation, and you will succeed. There is no majority, believe me, to be compared to cannon and a good army." With these words he took his hat and went out. "The words," said Lord Liverpool, "of a man of war, but not of a statesman." "The Duke of Wellington," rejoined Mr Canning, "thinks himself always on the field of battle; and yet he has himself put a period to the bloody era of conquest. He understands nothing of constitutional dominations, which are yet the only ones which now have any chance of dura- 33, 37, 41. tion."1* 1 Marcellus, of the The war which divided in this manner the opinions of 68. the most eminent men and the strongest heads of Europe, Difficulties at length began in good earnest. The Duke d'Angou- French at lême, as already noticed, left Paris for the army on of the cam15th March. At the very threshold, however, of his paign, *At this juncture the following highly interesting conversation took place between Mr Canning and M. Marcellus:—“À quoi bon," disait M. Canning, "soutenir un principe qui prête fant à la discussion, et sur lequel vous voyez que nous sommes enfin, vous et moi, si peu d'accord? Un Bourbon va au secours d'un Bourbon ! Vous réveillez ainsi en nous mille souvenirs d'inimitié, l'invasion de Louis XIV. en Espagne, l'inabilité de nos efforts pour éloigner sa puissante dynastie du trône de Madrid. Jugez-en quand un roi donne au peuple les institutions dont le peuple a besoin, quel a été le procédé de l'Angleterre? Elle expulsa ce roi, et mit à sa place un roi d'une famille alliée sans doute, mais qui se trouve ainsi non plus; un fils de la royauté confiant dans les droits de ses ancêtres, mais le fils des institutions nationales, tirant tous ses droits de cette seule origine. Puisque Ferdinand, comme Jacques II., résiste aux volontés de sa nation, appliquons la méthode anglaise à l'Espagne. Qu'en résulte-t-il? L'expulsion de Ferdinand. Écoutez-moi; cet exemple peut s'étendre jusqu'à vous. Vous n'ignorez pas qu'un désordre du dogme de légitimité presque pareille à la notre se leve et coude en France en ce moment. Vous savez quel progrès elle fait dans le parti d'une opposition prétendue modérée. La tête à couronner est là.”—Marcellus, 19, 20. the entrance XII. 1823. CHAP. career, an unexpected difficulty presented itself. Inexperienced for the most part in actual warfare, from the peace of eight years which had now continued, the commissaries and civil functionaries attached to the French army were in a great measure ignorant of the vast scale on which, when a hundred thousand men are to be put in motion, supplies of every sort must be furnished. Considerable magazines of corn had been formed at Bayonne and other places on the frontier; but, by a strange oversight, nothing had been done to provide forage for the horses, and the means of transport were wholly awanting. A hundred millions of francs (£4,000,000) had been placed at the disposal of the general-in-chief for the purchase of provisions on the march to Madrid-for Napoleon's system of making war maintain war was no more to be thought of—but no correspondence had been opened with the persons along the route who were to furnish the supplies. In these circumstances, it seemed impossible for the troops to move forward; and so great was the alarm produced in Paris by the reports transmitted by the Duke d'Angoulême when he reached headquarters, that Government took the most vigorous measures to apply a remedy to the evil. The Minister of War (Victor) was directed, by an ordonnance of 23d March, to proceed immediately to the army, invested with ample powers, and the title of Major-general; all the soldiers who had obtained leave of absence down to the 31st December 1822 were recalled to their standards; and a law was brought forward by the interim war-minister vi. 139,140; (Count Digeon) to authorise the king to call out, in the 199, 200; course of the present year, the conscripts pertaining to the year 1823, who, by the existing law, would not be required before the spring of 1824.1 1 Ann. Hist. Lam. vii. Cap. vii. 152, 154. These measures, however, though calculated to provide for the future, had no influence on the present; they would neither feed the starving horses, nor drag along the ponderous guns and baggage-waggons. In this extremity, the XII. 1823. obviated by Europe, c. 13. fortune of the expedition, and with it the destiny, for the CHAP. time at least, of the Restoration, was determined by the vigour and capacity of one man (M. OUVRARD)—a great 69. French capitalist, who had concluded a treaty with the which are King of Spain, which secured to him in 1805 the trea- M.Ouvrard. sures of the Indies, and which, after having enabled Napoleon to fit out the army which conquered at Austerlitz, excited his jealousy so violently as for the time occasioned Ouvrard's ruin. He stepped forward, and offered-on 1 Hist. of terms advantageous to himself, without doubt, but still Ixii. § 10, more advantageous to the public-to put the whole supplies of the army on the most satisfactory footing, and to charge himself with the conveyance of all its artillery and equipages. The necessity of the case, and the obvious. inefficiency of the existing commissaries, left no time for deliberation the known capacity and vast credit of M. Ouvrard supported his offer, how gigantic soever it may have at first appeared; and in a few days a contract was concluded with the adventurous capitalist, whereby the duty of supplying whole furnishings for the army was devolved on him. By the influence of the Duchess d'Angoulême, and the obvious necessity of the case, the contract was ratified at Paris; and although it excited violent clamours at the time, as all measures do which disappoint expectant cupidity, the event soon proved that never had a wiser step been adopted. The magic wand of M. Ouvrard overcame everything; his golden key unlocked unheard-of magazines of all sorts for the use of the troops; in a few days plenty reigned in all the magazines, the means of transport were amply provided, and confidence was reestablished at headquarters. So serene was the calm which succeeded to the storm, that the discord which had broken out in the Duke d'Angoulême's staff was appeased; General Guilleminot, who had been suspended from his command, was restored to the confidence of the com- 155; Lam. vii. 201, mander-in-chief; Marshal Victor, relinquishing his duties 205. as major-general, returned to the war-office at Paris; 2 Ann, Hist. 376; Cap. vi. 139, 140, vii. 154, CHAP. and the army, amply provided with everything, advanced in the highest spirits to the banks of the Bidassoa. XII. 1823. 70. their dispo sition on both sides. The preparations on both sides were of the most Forces, and formidable description, and seemed to prognosticate the long and bloody war which Mr Canning's ardent mind anticipated from the shock of opinions, which was to set all Europe on fire. The forces with which France took the field were very great, and, for the first time since the catastrophe of Waterloo, enabled her to appear on the theatre of Europe as a great military power. Wonderful, indeed, had been the resurrection of her strength under the wise and pacific reign of Louis XVIII. The army assembled at Bayonne for the invasion of Spain by the western Pyrenees mustered ninety-one thousand combatants. It was divided into four corps, the command of which was intrusted with generous, but, as the event proved, not undeserved confidence, to the victorious generals of Napoleon. The first corps, under the command of Marshal Oudinot, with Counts d'Autichamp and Borout under him, was destined to cross the Bidassoa, and march direct by the great road upon Madrid. The second, which was commanded by Count Molitor, was destined to support the left flank of the first corps, and advance by the Pass of Roncesvalles and the Valley of Bastan upon Pampeluna. Prince Hohenlohe commanded the third corps, which was to protect the right flank of the first, and secure its rear and communications during the advance to Madrid from the Bidassoa. The fourth corps, under the orders of the Duke of Cornigliano (Marshal Moncey), was to operate, detached from the remainder of the army, in Catalonia; while the fifth, under the orders of General Count Bordesoul, composed of a division of the Guard under Count Bourmont, and of two divisions of cavalry, was to form the reserve vi. 374,377. of the grand army,-but, in point of fact, it was almost constantly with the advanced posts.1 1 Ann. Hist. The Spanish forces intended to meet this political cru XII. 1823. 71. ish forces. sade were not less formidable, so far as numerical amount CHAP. was considered; but they were a very different array if discipline, equipments, and unanimity of feeling were regarded as the test. They consisted of 123,000 men, of The Spanwhom 15,000 were cavalry, and a new levy of 30,000, who were thus disposed. In Biscay, opposite to the Bidassoa, were 20,000, under Ballasteros; in Catalonia, under Mina, 20,000; in the centre, 18,000 under d'Abisbal; in Galicia, 10,000 in garrison, in the fortresses, 52,000. The forces on either side were thus not unequal in point of numerical amount; but there was a vast difference in their discipline, organisation, and equipment. On the French side these were all perfect, on the Spanish they were very deficient. Many of the corps were imperfectly disciplined, ill fed, and worse clothed. The cavalry was in great part wretchedly mounted, the artillery crazy or worn out, the commissariat totally inefficient. Penury pervaded the treasury; revolutionary cupidity had squandered the resources of the soldiers, scanty as they were. Above all, the troops were conscious that the cause they were supporting was not that of the nation. Eleventwelfths of the people, including the whole rural population, were hostile to their cause, and earnestly prayed for its overthrow; and even the inhabitants of Madrid 1 Rapport and the seaport towns, who had hitherto constituted its aux Cortès, entire support, were sensibly cooled in their ardour, now 1823; Ann. that it became a hazardous one, and called for sacrifices 379, 380. instead of promising fortune.1 Jan. 1, Hist. vi. 72. scene at the passage of soa. On the 5th April, the French were grouped in such force on the banks of the Bidassoa, that it was evident Theatrical a passage would be attempted on the following day. The French ensigns had last been seen there on 7th the BidasOctober 1813, when the passage was forced by the Duke of Wellington. In anticipation of this movement, the Spaniards had made great preparations.2 A considerable Europe, force was drawn up on the margin of the stream; but §19. it was not on them that the principal reliance of 2 Hist. of c. lxxxiii. |