XII. the north of the Pyrenees. It never occurred to him CHAP. that, without the support of the allied bayonets, that constitution never would have been accepted in his own dominions.* 1822. 25. it in the morency, ceeded by M. de Cha teaubriand. As soon as M. de Montmorency was made acquainted with this secret intrigue, which virtually superseded him Debate on in his own department in the most important branch of Cabinet, state policy, he insisted on a meeting of the Cabinet being and resig called. The point submitted to them was, whether a de- M. de Montcided note prepared by M. de Montmorency, in accor- who is sucdance with what had been agreed on at Verona, and to which his personal honour as well as the faith of France stood pledged, should be forwarded to Madrid, to supersede the conciliatory and temporising one prepared by M. de Villèle? A majority of the council approved of M. de Montmorency's note; in particular, Peyronnet and Clermont-Tonnerre were energetic in its support. The Duke of Belluno (Victor) strongly advocated the same side. He represented the state of opinion in the army, which he as war-minister had peculiar means of know * The note of M. de Villèle approved of by Louis XVIII. set forth-" Since the revolution which occurred in Spain in April 1820, France, regardless of the dangers with which she herself was threatened by that revolution, has used its best endeavours to draw closer the bonds which unite the two kings, and to maintain the connections which unite the two people. But the influences which had led to the changes in the Spanish monarchy have become more powerful than the changes themselves, as it was easy to foresee would be the case. A constitution which King Ferdinand had neither recognised nor accepted in resuming his crown, was imposed upon him by a military insurrection. The natural consequence of that has been, that every discontented Spaniard has conceived himself entitled to seek by the same method an order of things more in harmony with his opinions and principles, and the use of force has caused it to be regarded as a right. Thence the movement of the guard at Madrid, the appearance of armed corps in different parts of Spain. The provinces adjoining France have been the principal theatre of that civil war. Thence arose the necessity on the part of France to take measures for its own security. The events which have taken place since the establishment of the army of observation at the foot of the Pyrenees have sufficiently justified the foresight of his Majesty in forming it. The precautions of France have appeared just to its allies; and the Continental powers have adopted the resolution to unite themselves to her, if it should become necessary, to maintain her dignity and repose. France would have been contented with a resolution at once so friendly and honourable to her; but Austria, Prussia, and XII. 1822. CHAP. ing; that the example of the Spanish revolution was extremely dangerous for the throne of France; that the impression it had already produced upon the soldiers might prove prejudicial to the tranquillity of the country; that it was absolutely necessary to act, to extirpate by force that mania for military revolutions; that the army was well affected, and would become, in a campaign, devoted to the Bourbons, but that it was extremely dangerous to leave it at rest on the frontier. 'Nothing," he added, "is so easy of corruption as a body of troops in a state of inaction: when they advance, they become animated with one spirit, and are incapable of treachery.” On the other hand, M. de Villèle, M. de Lauriston, and M. de Corbière argued in favour of the pacific note, as likely to conciliate matters, and avoid the serious risks of a war of opinion, which might involve all Europe in con1 Cap. viii. flagration. The matter was still in suspense, and the issue doubtful, when Louis cut the matter short by declaring that the note of M. de Villèle appeared to him to express with more prudence than that of M. de Montmorency the opinion of his Cabinet. The consequence 11,14; Lam. vii. 108, 109. Russia have deemed it necessary to add to that act of the Alliance a manifes tation of their own sentiments. Diplomatic notes have in consequence been addressed to the representatives of these powers at Madrid, who will follow the instructions of their respective courts. As for you, M. le Comte, you will say that the Government of the King is intimately united with his allies in the firm determination to repel by every means the revolutionary principle; and that it participates equally strongly with them in the desire which they feel that the noble Spanish nation may find a remedy of itself for the evils which afflict it-evils which are of a kind to disquiet the governments of Europe, and impose upon them precautions always painful. You will assure them that the people of the Peninsula, restored to tranquillity, will always find in their neighbours sincere and loyal friends. The succour of all kinds which France can dispose of in favour of Spain will always be offered to insure its happiness and increase its prosperty; but you will declare at the same time, that France will relax in none of its protective measures so long as Spain shall be torn by factions. His Majesty's government will not hesitate to recall you from Madrid, and to seek for guarantees in more effective dispositions, if his essential interests continue to be compromised, and if he loses all hope of an amelioration, which he still hopes from the sentiments which have so long united the French and Spaniards in the love of their kings and of a wise liberty."-Le President du Conseil des Ministres au M. le Comte DE LA GARDE, Ambassadeur à Madrid, Paris, 25th Dec. 1822; LACRETELLE, Histoire de la Restauration, iii. 477-479. Pièces Justificatifs. XII. 1822. was, that M. de Montmorency tendered his resignation, CHAP. which was accepted; and M. de Chateaubriand, whom public opinion rather than the private favour of the monarch had already designed for his successor, was appointed in his stead. 26. like pre parations of France con tinue. Although, however, M. de Chateaubriand was borne forward to the portfolio of foreign affairs by a movement The warin the Cabinet which implied an entire change of national policy on the vital question now at issue between France and Spain, yet no such alteration in effect took place; and he was compelled, nothing loth, to fall into the system of his predecessor. The pacific note drawn up by M. de Villèle, and approved of by Louis XVIII., was sent to M. de Lagarde, at Madrid, on the 25th December, soon after the more decided notes of the other Continental powers had been presented; but the warlike preparations were not for a moment suspended, and the march of troops to the foot of the Pyrenees continued without intermission. In truth, the current of public opinion in France ran so strongly in favour of war, that, like similar transports which have prevailed in other countries on similar occasions, it was irresistible, and, for good or for evil, must work out its destined effects. The war party in the legislature, always strong, had been greatly augmented by the result of the annual election of a fifth in the preceding autumn, and it now comprehended five-sixths of the entire Chamber of Deputies. On this occasion, too, for the first time since the Restoration, it carried a vast majority of the French nation with it. All classes concurred in demanding hostilities. The Royalists felt their blood roused at the approach of strife, as the war-horse does at the sound of the trumpet. The army rejoiced at the prospect of a contest, and joyfully wended their way to the Pyrenees, hoping to efface the disgrace of Baylen and Vittoria; the peasants trusted that the days of the Empire and of glory were about to return, and the fields of Spain to be laid open to their ambition or their plunder; the mercantile VOL. II. 2 s XII. 1823. CHAP. classes and shopkeepers apprehended, indeed, a diminution of their profits from a rupture of peace, and approved the cautious policy of M. de Villèle, but they were not in sufficient strength to withstand the general current. The revolutionists and democrats in secret were not disinclined to hostilities; they hoped that the troops, when brought 23,25; Lam. into collision with the tricolor standard, would desert their colours, and that, in an attempt to restore the throne of another monarch, Louis would lose his own.1 1 Cap. vii. vii. 111, 112. 27. the negotia .drid, and ambassador. Jan. 18. The British government, however, aware of the diviFailure of sion on the subject which prevailed in the French cabinet, tions at Ma- and of the aversion of the king to war, did all that departure of Was possible to avert hostilities. Sir William A'Court. the French the ambassador at Madrid, received instructions to exert himself to the utmost to procure such a modification of the Constitution from the Cortes itself as might take away all pretext for French interference; and Lord Fitzroy Somerset was, in the first week of January, despatched from Paris by the Duke of Wellington, in order to co-operate in the same object. All their efforts, however, were in vain. The Spanish government, with that confidence in itself, and insensibility to external danger, which is so characteristic of the nation, obstinately refused to make any concession, or modify the Consti2 Duke of tution in the smallest particular. The consequence was, that the ambassadors of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, Somerset, after having delivered their respective notes as agreed 1823; Ann. on at the Congress, withdrew from Madrid; and alHist. vi. though the French minister remained behind, and with Sir W. A'Court continued his good offices, yet they viii. 36, 39. came to nothing; and ere long M. de Chateaubriand despatched a note to M. de Lagarde,2* recapitulating Wellington to Lord Fitzroy Jan. 6, 705; Lam. vii. 113, 114; Cap. *"Le Gouvernement Espagnol rejetait toute mesure de conciliation; nonseulement il ne montrait aucun espoir de l'amélioration que l'on pourrait attendre des sentiments qui avaient, pendant si longtemps, uni les Espagnols et les Français; mais il allait jusqu'à exiger que la France retirât son armée d'observation, et expulsât les étrangers qui lui avaient demandé asile. France n'est pas accoutumée à entendre un pareil langage, et elle ne le par La 1 XII. 1823. all the grounds of complaint which France had against CHAP. Spain, and directing him forthwith to demand his passport. This was accordingly done, and the rapid concentration of forces on the Pyrenees left no doubt that war in good earnest was approaching. a 28. the King at of the Jan. 28. The French Chambers met on the 28th January, and the speech of the king, delivered with great solemnity Speech of to a crowded assembly, resounded like a clap of thun- the opening der throughout Europe. "France owed to Europe a Chambers. prosperity which no nation can ever obtain but by return to religion, legitimacy, order, and true liberty. It is now giving that salutary example; but the Divine justice permits that, after having made other nations long feel the terrible effects of our discord, we should ourselves be exposed to the dangers arising from similar calamities in a neighbouring kingdom. I have tried," said the king, in a firm accent, "everything to secure the peace of my people, and to preserve Spain herself from the last misfortunes; but all in vain. The infatuation with which my efforts have been rejected at Madrid leaves little hope of the possibility of maintaining peace. I have ordered the recall of my minister. A hundred thousand men, commanded by a prince of my family donne à son auteur qu'en considération de l'exaspération qui règne en Espagne. Quiconque met le pied sur le territoire français est libre, et jouit des droits d'une hospitalité inviolable. Les victimes des commotions qui agitaient l'Espagne s'y étaient réfugiées, et étaient traitées avec tous les égards dus au malheur. L'Espagne s'est-elle conduite d'une plus mauvaise manière envers la France? Non-seulement elle a donné asile à des hommes coupables, condamnés par les tribunaux, mais encore elle leur a promis des emplois dans ses armées. La confusion qui règne en Espagne actuellement est préjudiciable à quelquesuns de nos plus grands intérêts. Sa Majesté avait désiré que son ministre pût rester à Madrid après le départ des ambassadeurs d'Autriche, de Prusse, et de Russie; mais ses derniers vœux n'ont pas été écoutés ; sa dernière espérance a été déçue; le mauvais génie des révolutions préside maintenant aux conseils de l'Espagne, tout espoir est éloigné ; comme l'expression des sentiments les plus modérés ne nous attire que de nouvelles provocations, il ne peut convenir, M. le Comte, à la dignité du roi, et à l'honneur de la France, que vous restiez plus longtemps à Madrid. En conséquence, veuillez demander vos passe-ports pour vous-même et toute votre légation, et partez sans perdre de temps immédiate ment après qu'ils vous auront été remis."-M. de Chateaubriand à M. le Comte de Lagarde, Paris, Jan. 5, 1853; CAPEFIGUE, Histoire de la Restauration, viii. 37, 38. |