XII. 1822. ?" CHAP. France, in case, on her requisition, such assistance might appear necessary To these questions "the three Continental powers answered, on the 30th October, that they would follow the example of France in respect to their diplomatic relations; that they would take the same attitude which France took; and that they would give all the succour of which it might stand in need. A treaty was to fix the period and mode of that co-operation." The Duke of Wellington answered, on the part of Great Britain, "that having no information as to the causes of this misunderstanding, and not being in a situation to form a judgment on the hypothetical case put, it was impossible for him to answer any of the questions.' It was afterwards agreed that, instead of a joint note being prepared by the four Continental powers, and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries, each should' ton's Memo- address a separate note to the Cabinet of Madrid of the same general import, but containing in detail the views by which they were severally actuated; which was accordof France; ingly done: while the Duke of Wellington addressed a v. 684,686. note to the Congress, stating the reasons why his Government abstained from any such intervention.1* 1 Welling randum, Nov. 12, 1822, and Questions Ann. Hist. The notes of the four Continental powers were all of the same import; that of Prussia was the most explicit, and was in these terms: "The Prussian Government sees with grief the Spanish Government enter upon a career which menaces the tranquillity of Europe; it recollects the title to the admiration of the world which the Spanish nation has given during so many ages, and the heroic perseverance with which it has triumphed over the ambitious and oppressive efforts of the usurper of the throne of France. The moral state of Spain is such at present, that the foreign powers must necessarily find themselves disturbed by it. Doctrines subversive of all social order are there openly preached and protected; daily insults against all the sovereigns of Europe fill its journals with impunity. The clubs of Spain have their emissaries in all quarters, to associate with their dark designs conspirators in every country against the public order and the legitimate authority. The inevitable effect of these disorders is seen in the interruption of the relations between France and Spain. The irritation to which it gives rise is such as to inspire the most serious alarm as to the preservation of peace between the two countries. That consideration itself would suffice to determine the united sovereigns to break silence on a state of things which from day to day threatens to compromise the tranquillity of Europe. It is not for foreign powers to determine what institutions answer best for the character, manners, and real necessities of the Spanish nation; but it belongs to them undoubt CHAP. XII. 1822. 22. what had this Con The business of the Congress at Verona was now concluded, and it had turned out entirely to the advantage of France; for not only had she gained the consent of all the Continental states to the policy which she Views of deemed it expedient to adopt, but, what was of equal occurred in importance, she had been allowed to remain the judge of gress. that policy: the other powers had agreed to follow in her wake, not take the lead. For the first time for a very long period, England found herself isolated on the Continent, and doomed to be the impotent spectator of operations which she neither approved of nor could pre edly to judge of the effects which experience has taught them such changes produce upon themselves, and to fix their determination and future position in regard to Spain on these considerations."-CHATEAUBRIAND, Congrès de Verone, i. 130, 131. On the other hand, the Duke of Wellington, in his note to the Continental sovereigns, said: "The origin, circumstances, and consequences of the Spanish Revolution, the existing state of affairs in Spain, and the conduct of those who have been at the head of the Spanish Government, may have endangered the safety of other countries, and may have excited the uneasiness of the Governments whose ministers I am now addressing, and those Governments may think it necessary to address the Spanish Government upon the topics referred to in their despatches. But I would request those Ministers to consider whether the measures now proposed are calculated to allay the irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture, and whether they might not with advantage be delayed to a later period. They are certainly calculated to irritate the Government of Spain; to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation which subsists between that Government and France to call down upon Spain the power of the Alliance, and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French Government. His Majesty's Government is of opinion, that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent state, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of his Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which his Majesty has invariably acted on all questions concerning the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve his Majesty in serious responsibility if they should produce any effect, and must irritate if they should not; and if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish Government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable discussion between that country and France. The King's Government must therefore decline to advise his Majesty to hold a common language with his allies upon this occasion; and it is so necessary for his Majesty not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his Government must equally refrain from advising his Majesty to direct that any communication should be made to the Spanish Government on the subject of its relations with France."-Duke of WELLINGTON'S Note to the Allied Powers, 20th November 1822; Annual Register, 1822, p. 101. (Public Documents.) CHAP. vent. XII. 1822. Without following out farther the thread of the negotiations, which were now substantially decided, it is more material to show what were the secret views of the French diplomatists in this, for them, auspicious state of affairs. "The despatch of M. de Montmorency," said Chateaubriand to M. de Villèle, "will show you the conclusion of the affair of Spain, which has turned out entirely as you wished. This evening we are to have a conference, to determine on the mode of making known the sentiments of the Alliance to Europe. Russia is marvellously favourable; Austria is with us on this, though on other points inclined to the English policy; Prussia follows Austria. The wish of the powers is decidedly pronounced for a war with Spain. It is for you, my dear friend, to consider whether you ought not to seize the occasion, perhaps unique, to replace France in the rank of military powers; to restore the white cockade in a war, in short, almost without danger, to which the opinions of the Royalists and the army strongly incline. There is no question of the occupation of the Peninsula, but of a rapid movement which would restore power to the true Spaniards, and take away from you all disquietude for the future. The last despatches of M. Lagarde prove how easy that success would be. All continental Europe would be for us; and if England took umbrage, she would not even have time to throw herself on a colony. As to the Chambers, success covers everything. Doubtless commerce and the finances would suffer for a moment, lèle, Vero- but nothing great can be done without some inconveniences. To destroy a focus of Jacobinism, to re-establish a Bourbon on the throne by the arms of a Bourbon,— these are results which outweigh all considerations of a secondary nature."1 1 Chateaubriand to M. de Vil na, Oct. 31, 1822; Congrès de Ve rone, i. 144, 145. But while M. de Chateaubriand, M. de Montmorency, and the war party, were with reason congratulating themselves on the success of France at the Congress, very different views were entertained by Louis XVIII. XII. 1822. 23. de Villèle XVIII. and M. de Villèle at Paris. They were sincerely pacific CHAP. in their ideas, and, not without reason, extremely apprehensive of the possible consequences of a war with Spain. It was not external, but internal, danger that Views of M. they dreaded. They were well aware that Spain, in its and Louis distracted state, would be wholly unable to withstand the arms of France, if these arms were united; but who could answer for this unanimity prevailing in a war of opinion, when the French troops grouped round the white flag were to be met by the Spanish arrayed under the tricolor standards? The recent disasters of the Royalists in Spain had shown how little reliance was to be placed on their support in any serious conflict; and was there no reason to apprehend that, if the arms and the Liberal press of England were engaged on the side of the republicans in the Peninsula, a convulsion fatal to the reigning dynasty might ensue to the south of the Channel? These considerations weighed much both with the king and his Prime Minister; and although, on his return from the Congress, M. de Montmorency was made a duke, yet grave doubts were still entertained whether it was either prudent or safe to go into the measures agreed on by the Congress. They were confirmed in these opinions by the Duke of Wellington, who, on his way back from Verona, had a long and confidential interview with Louis XVIII. at Paris, in which he represented to him in the strongest manner the extreme danger which France would run in the event of a rupture, both from internal dissension and the loss of the alliance and moral support of England. The great personal influence of the Duke of Wellington, the services he had rendered to the royal cause, and the obvious weight of his argu- 1 Lam. vii. ments, produced such an effect, that they had well-nigh 107, 108; overturned everything done at Verona, and detached 5,7 France from the alliance of the Continental sovereigns.1* The Duke's instructions on this occasion were as follows: "The Duke of Wellington may declare openly to his Majesty the King of France, that the Cap. viii. XII. 1822. 24. Secret cor respondence of M. de garde. CHAP. The first effect it produced was to overturn M. de Montmorency, and place M. de Chateaubriand in his stead. So uneasy was the king at what the Duke of Wellington had represented, that he demanded a distinct explanation from M. de Montmorency of the causes of Villale and complaint which he had against the Spanish government. The latter replied, "that the causes of difference between France and Spain were not of so precise a kind as to admit of an exact and special definition; that a new state of things had been formed by the relations of the two countries; that the opinions in the ascendant in Spain were such as to endanger his Majesty's dominions, and that France would rather incur all the risks of war than expose itself to the inconveniences of the other alternative." Meanwhile the journals in the interest of the respective ministers commenced a violent contest on the subject, the Journal des Debats maintaining the necessity of preserving peace, the Quotidienne the imperative duty of going to war. In this state of division, both in respect of public opinion and in his own Cabinet, the king, with the concurrence of M. de Villèle, adopted the questionable step of opening, through the Prime Minister, a secret correspondence with M. de Lagarde, the ambassador at Madrid, unknown to the Foreign Minister, in which he recommended a conciliatory course of policy, entirely at variance with what had been agreed upon at the Congress, and very nearly in accordance with the views of England on the subject. The idea of Louis XVIII., and which flattered his secret vanity, was, that 1 Cap. viii. Ferdinand VII. should follow his example, and give a vii. 107,108. constitution to his subjects, which might establish a representative monarchy in harmony with that existing to 7, 10; Lam. Government of His Britannic Majesty has always been opposed to any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. The Spanish Government bas given no cause of complaint to any power, and the defects of its constitution are a matter of internal politics, with which no foreign power has any title to interfere." Mr CANNING'S Memorandum to the DUKE OF WELLIngton, Nov. 4, 1822; CAPEFIGUE, viii. 5, 6. |