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XII.

1822.

CHAP. able note, drawn by M. de Chateaubriand, on the part of France" In so grave a question, France feels that Spain should, in the first instance, be consulted as sovereign de jure of these colonies. France concurs with England in holding that, when intestine troubles have long prevailed, and the law of nations has thereby been practically abrogated, on account of the weakness of one of the belligerent powers, natural right resumes its empire. She admits that there are inevitable prescriptions of some rights, and that, after a government has long resisted, it is sometimes obliged to yield to overbearing necessity, in order to terminate many evils, and prevent one state from alone reaping advantages in which other states are entitled to participate. But to prevent the jealousies and rivalries of commerce, which might involve governments against their will in hostilities, some general measure should be adopted; and perhaps it would be possible to reconcile the interests of Spain, of its colonies, and of the European states, by a measure which, founded on the broad basis of equality and reciprocity, might bring into harmony also the rights of legitimacy and the necessities of policy." The proposed measure, as a matter of course, came to nothing; but the circumstance of 1 Chateau- its being broached at all proved what adverse interests grès de Ve- were arising in the world, and the seeds of what divisions rone, i. 89, were germinating beneath the treacherous surface of the European alliance.1

briand, Con

94.

18.

of M. de

M. de Mont

garding

Spain.

But all these subjects of division, important and pregInstructions nant with future changes as they were, yielded to the Villele to Spanish question, for the solution of which the Conmorency regress had been assembled, and which required immediate decision. The instructions of M. de Villèle on this subject were very cautiously worded, and intended, above all, to avoid the appearance of France requesting from the other powers instructions how to act in the affairs of the Peninsula. They bore, "We have not determined to make war on Spain; the Cortes would

XII.

1822.

carry Ferdinand back to Cadiz rather than suffer him to CHAP. be conducted to Verona. The situation of France is not such as to oblige us to ask for permission for a war of invasion, as Austria was at Laybach; for we are under no necessity of declaring war at all, nor of asking for succour to carry it on if we do; and we could not admit of it, if it should lead to the passage of foreign troops through our territory. The opinion of our plenipotentiaries upon the question of what the Congress should determine on in regard to Spain is, that France is the sole power which should act with its troops, and that it must be the sole judge of when it is necessary to do so. The French plenipotentiaries must never consent that the Congress should prescribe the conduct which France should pursue in regard to Spain. They should accept of no pecuniary succour nor aid from the passage of troops through our territory. They should be firm in considering the Spanish question in its general aspect, and endeavour to obtain from the Congress a contingent treaty, honourable and advantageous to France, either Chateaufor the case of a war between herself and Spain, or for grès de Vethe case of the powers recognising the independence of 104. South America." 1

briand, Con.

rone, i. 102,

19.

structions

Welling

On the other hand, the instructions of England to her plenipotentiary were equally decided, and such as Mr Canapparently to render almost unavoidable a rupture be- ning's intween the two powers. Lord Londonderry, before his to Duke of death, had drawn up a note for our plenipotentiaries, ton. which repudiated, in the strongest manner, any inter- 1822. ference in the domestic concerns of Spain.* Mr Canning had only been forty-eight hours in office when he was

* "With respect to Spain, there seems nothing to add to, or vary, in the course of policy hitherto pursued. Solicitude for the royal family, observance of our engagements with Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country, must be considered as forming the limits of his Majesty's policy."-Marquess LONDONDERRY'S Instructions, transferred to the Duke of Wellington, Sept. 14, 1822. Annual Register, 1822, p. 96. (Public Documents.)

Sept. 27,

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1822.

CHAP. called on to give his instructions to the Duke of Wellington, who was appointed successor to that lamented nobleman as the plenipotentiary of England; but he had no difficulty in at once drawing them up. His private inclination, not less than his public duty, led him to adhere to the line marked out by Lord Londonderry. His instructions to Wellington, accordingly, on this point were, "If there be a determined project to interfere, by force or by menace, in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are his Majesty's Ministers of the uselessness and danger of any such interference, so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that, when the necessity arises—or, I would rather say, when an opportunity presents itself—I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and decidedly to declare, that to any such interference his Majesty will not be a party.”1

1 Mr Can

ning's In

structions

to Welling27, 18:22; Ann. Reg. Public Do

ton, Sept.

1822, 97

cuments; and Ann.

Hist. v.

683.

20. Measures

adopted by

gress on the

subject.

When instructions so directly at variance were given to the English and French plenipotentiaries upon a great the majority public question, on which an instant decision required to of the Con- be taken by the powers immediately concerned, it need not be said that the peace of Europe was seriously threatened. In effect, the divergence of opinion upon this point, as well as the ulterior one of recognising the independence of the revolted colonies in South America, was so great, that it probably would have been broken, and a calamitous war ensued, if the other powers had been less unanimous and decided than they were in supporting the French view of the necessity of an armed intervention. The Emperor Alexander, from the first, both officially through his plenipotentiaries, and privately in society, expressed his opinion in the strongest manner on this subject, and declared his readiness to support any measures which France might deem essential for its safety. Prussia adopted the same views: the obligations contracted in 1813 rendered no other course practicable

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1822.

to the Cabinet of Berlin. Austria was more doubtful: CHAP. Metternich had a mortal dread of the northern Colossus, and in secret urged M. de Villèle to adopt no measures which should give the Emperor of Russia a pretext for again moving his troops across Germany. But as he was fully impressed with the danger to Europe from the revolutionary principles acted upon in Spain, and he had himself coerced them in the most vigorous manner in Italy, he could not ostensibly deviate from the other Continental powers on a subject so vital to their common welfare. Accordingly, after several conferences, in the course of which the Duke of Wellington strongly insisted on the necessity of limiting their interference with Spain to resistance to its external aggressions or attempts at Verbal, Oct. propagandism, but not attempting any armed interference 20,and Nov. with its domestic concerns, the matter came to this, that Ann. Hist. the Duke of Wellington refused to sign the procès ver- Chateaubaux of the conference, when the opinions of the other Congrès de powers were expressed in favour of an intervention, in 104, 120. certain events, in the Peninsula.1

1 Procès

17, 1822;

v. 683, 685;

briand,

Verone, i.

21.

proposed by

the Conti

powers and

The mode of deliberating on this subject was very peculiar, but well calculated to cut short the usual eva- Questions sions and subterfuges of diplomatic intercourse. France, France, and through its minister, proposed three questions to the Con- answers of gress, which were as follows: "1. In case France should nental find herself under the necessity of recalling her ambas- England. sador from Madrid, and interrupting all diplomatic relations with Spain, are the great powers disposed to adopt similar steps, and to break off their intercourse with that country also? 2. If war should break out between France and Spain, in what way, and by what acts, would the great powers give France their moral support, in such a manner as to inspire a salutary terror into the revolutionists of all countries? 3. What, in fine, are the intentions of the great powers in regard to the extent of the material succour which they are disposed to give to

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1822.

CHAP. France, in case, on her requisition, such assistance might appear necessary?" To these questions "the three Continental powers answered, on the 30th October, that they would follow the example of France in respect to their diplomatic relations; that they would take the same attitude which France took; and that they would give all the succour of which it might stand in need. A treaty was to fix the period and mode of that co-operation." The Duke of Wellington answered, on the part of Great Britain, " that having no information as to the causes of this misunderstanding, and not being in a situation to form a judgment on the hypothetical case put, it was impossible for him to answer any of the questions." It was afterwards agreed that, instead of a joint note being prepared by the four Continental powers, and signed by their respective plenipotentiaries, each should 1 Wellington's Memo- address a separate note to the Cabinet of Madrid of the same general import, but containing in detail the views Questions by which they were severally actuated; which was accordof France; ingly done: while the Duke of Wellington addressed a v. 684,686. note to the Congress, stating the reasons why his Government abstained from any such intervention.1*

randum,

Nov. 12,

1822, and

Ann. Hist.

The notes of the four Continental powers were all of the same import; that of Prussia was the most explicit, and was in these terms: "The Prussian Government sees with grief the Spanish Government enter upon a career which menaces the tranquillity of Europe; it recollects the title to the admiration of the world which the Spanish nation has given during so many ages, and the heroic perseverance with which it has triumphed over the ambitious and oppressive efforts of the usurper of the throne of France. The moral state of Spain is such at present, that the foreign powers must necessarily find themselves disturbed by it. Doctrines subversive of all social order are there openly preached and protected; daily insults against all the sovereigns of Europe fill its journals with impunity. The clubs of Spain have their emissaries in all quarters, to associate with their dark designs conspirators in every country against the public order and the legitimate authority. The inevitable effect of these disorders is seen in the interruption of the relations between France and Spain. The irritation to which it gives rise is such as to inspire the most serious alarm as to the preservation of peace between the two countries. That consideration itself would suffice to determine the united sovereigns to break silence on a state of things which from day to day threatens to compromise the tranquillity of Europe. It is not for foreign powers to determine what institutions answer best for the character, manners, and real necessities of the Spanish nation; but it belongs to them undoubt

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