VIII. 1821. 1 Treaty, Feb. 2, 1821; Ann. Hist. iii. CHAP. been by the army under the Duke of Wellington. England and France were no parties to this treaty, but neither did they oppose it, or enter into any alliance with the revolutionary states. They simply remained neuter, passive spectators of a matter in which they were too remotely interested to be called on practically to interfere, but which they could not theoretically approve. reagh's Des- Lord Castlereagh contented himself with declaring that Great Britain could take no part in such transactions, as they were directly opposed to the fundamental laws of his country.1 642; Lord Castle patch, Jan. 19, 1821, ibid. ii. 689. 73. on the divi the allied powers. 1 % This deserves to be noted as a turning-point in the Reflections modern history of Europe. It marks the period when sion among separate views and interests began to shake the hitherto firmly cemented fabric of the Grand Alliance; and Great Britain and France, for the first time, assumed a part together at variance with the determination of the other great powers. They had not yet come into actual collision, much less open hostility; but their views had become so different, that it required not the gift of prophecy to fore * "Le système des mesures proposées serait, s'il était l'objet d'une réciprocité d'action, diamétralement opposé aux lois fondamentales de la Grande Bretagne; mais lors même que cette objection décisive n'existerait pas, le gouvernement Britannique n'en jugerait pas moins, que les principes qui servent de base à ces mesures, ne peuvent être admis avec quelque sûreté comme systêmes de loi entre les nations. Le gouvernement du roi pense que l'adoption de ces principes sanctionnerait inévitablement, et pourrait amener par la suite, de la part des souverains moins bienveillants, une intervention dans les affaires intérieures des états, beaucoup plus fréquente et plus étendue que celle dont il est persuadé que les augustes personnages ont l'intention d'user, ou, qui puisse se concilier avec l'intérêt général, ou avec l'autorité réelle, et la dignité des souverains indépendants. Quant à l'affaire particulière de Naples, le gouvernement Britannique n'a pas hésité, dès le commencement, à exprimer fortement son improbation de la manière dont cette Révolution s'est effectuée, et des circonstances dont elle paraissait avoir été accompagnée; mais en même temps, il déclara expressément aux différentes cours alliées, qu'il ne croyait pas devoir, ni même conseiller une intervention de la part de la Grande Bretagne. Il admit toujours que d'autres états Européens, et spécialement l'Autriche, et les puissances Italiennes, pouvaient juger que les circonstances étaient différentes relativement à eux, et il déclara que son intention n'était pas de préjuger la question en ce qui pouvait les affecter, ni d'intervenir dans la marche que tels états pourraient juger convenable d'adopter pour leur propre sûreté; pourvu toutefois, qu'ils fussent VIII. 1821. see that collision was imminent at no distant period. This CHAP. was the more remarkable, as England had been, during the whole of the revolutionary war, the head and soul of the alliance against France, and strenuously contended for the principle, that though no attempt should be made to force a government against their will on the French people, yet a coalition of the adjoining powers had become indispensable to prevent them from forcing their institutions upon other states. The allied governments commented freely on this great change of policy, and observed that England was very conservative as long as the danger was at her own door, and her own institutions were threatened by the rode au contagion of French principles; but that she became very Liberal when the danger was removed to a more distant 31, 1821; quarter, and the countries threatened were Italy, southern ii. 692, 693. Germany, or France itself.1 * 1 Le Comte de Nessel Compte de Stackelberg, Jan. Ann. Hist. To fix the just principles, and define the limits of the 74. right of intervention, is unquestionably one of the most Limits of the right difficult problems in politics, and one fraught with the of intervenmost momentous consequences. If the right is carried tion. out to its full extent, incessant warfare would, in civilised disposés à donner toutes les assurances raisonnables que, leurs vues n'étaient, ni dirigées vers des objets d'agrandissement, ni vers la subversion du système territorial de l'Europe, tel qu'il a été établi par les derniers traités."-CASTLEREAGH, Dépêche Circulaire, adressée aux Ministres de S. M. Britannique pour les Cours Etrangères, 19 Jan. 1821. Ann. Historique, ii. 688, 689. * "La Révolution de Naples a donné au monde un exemple, aussi instructif que déplorable, de ce que les nations ont à gagner, lorsqu' elles cherchent les réformes politiques dans les voies de la rébellion. Ourdie en secret par une secte, dont les maximes impies attaquent à la fois la religion, la morale, et tous les liens sociaux ; exécutée par des soldats traîtres à leurs serments: consommée par la violence, et les menaces dirigées contre le souvrain légitime, cette Révolution n'a produit que l'anarchie et la disposition militaire qu'elle a renforcée, au lieu de l'affaiblir, en créant un régime monstreux, incapable de servir de base à un gouvernement quel qu'il soit, incompatible avec tout ordre public, et avec les premiers besoins de la société. Les souverains alliés, ne pouvant, dès le principe se tromper sur les effets inévitables de ces funestes attentats; se décidèrent sur-le-champ à ne point admettre, comme légal, tout ce que la révolution et l'usurpation avaient prétendu établir dans le Royaume de Naples; et cette mesure fut adoptée par la presque totalité des gouvernements de l'Europe."LE COMTE NESSELRODE au COMTE DE STACKELBERG, Ambassadeur à Naples, Laybach, 19/31 Jan. 1821. Ann. Historique, ii. 693. 1821. CHAP. communities in different stages of civilisation, be the inVIII. evitable destiny of the species; for every republican state would seek to revolutionise its neighbours, and every despotic one to surround itself with a girdle of absolute monarchies. Each party loudly invokes the principle of non-intervention, when its opponents are acting on the opposite principle, and as certainly follows their example, when an opportunity occurs for establishing elsewhere a regime conformable to its own wishes or example. Perhaps it is impossible to draw the line more fairly than by saying, that no nation has a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another nation, unless that other is adopting measures which threaten its own peace and tranquillity in a word, that intervention is only justifiable when it is done for the purposes of self-defence. Yet is this a very vague and unsatisfactory basis on which to rest the principle; for who is to judge when internal tranquillity is threatened, and external intervention has become indispensable? It is much to be feared that here, as elsewhere, in the transactions of independent states, which acknowledge no superior, much must depend on the moderation of the stronger; and that "might makes right" will be the practice, whatever may be the law of nations, to the end of the world. But one thing is clear, that it is with the democratic party that the chief-indeed, of late years, the entire-blame of intervention rests. The monarchical powers have never moved since 1789 but in self-defence. Every war which has desolated Europe and afflicted humanity since that time has been provoked by the propagandism of republican states; if left to themselves, the absolute monarchs would have been too happy to slumber on, reposing on their laurels, weighed down by their debt, recovering from their fatigue. It was the circumstance of the three powers which had signed the Holy Alliance appearing banded together to The VIII. 1821. 75. had the Holy Almost this? liance in crush the revolution in Italy, which caused that Alliance CHAP. to be regarded as a league of sovereigns against the liberties of mankind, and to become the object of such unmeasured obloquy to the whole Liberal party throughout What share the world. There never was a greater mistake. Holy Alliance became a league, and it proved a efficient one, against the progress of revolution; but it was not so at first. It was forced into defensive measures by the aggressions of its political antagonists in Spain and Italy. Not one shot has been fired in Europe, nor one sabre drawn, from any contest which it commenced, though many have been so from those into which it has been driven. In truth, this celebrated Alliance, which was the creation of the benevolent dreams of the Emperor Alexander, and the mystical conceptions of Madame Krudener, was, as already explained, a philanthropic effusion, amiable in design, but unwise in thought, and 1 See Ante, incapable of application in a world such as that in which c. iii. § 51. we are placed.1 It is evident, however, that it was impossible for Eng- 76. on the oc land to have acted otherwise than as she did on this Attitude taken by occasion, and that the line which Lord Castlereagh took England was such as alone befitted the minister of a free people. casion. Being the representative of a country which had progressively extorted its liberties from its sovereigns, and at length changed the dynasty on the throne to secure them, he could not be a party to a league professing to extinguish popular resistance: placed at a distance from the theatre of danger, the plea of necessity could not be advanced to justify such a departure from principle. He took the only line which, on such an occasion, was consistent with his situation, and dictated by a due regard to the national interest ;-he abstained from taking any part in the contest, and contented himself with protesting against any abuse of the pretension on which it was rested. CHAP. 1821. 77. War declared against the revo- Naples. Feb. 8. The contest in Italy was of very short duration. The revolutionists proved incapable of defending themselves against an Austrian army, little more than half of their own strength; they were formidable only to their own sovereign. The Minister at War announced to the parliament at Naples, on the 2d January, that the regular army amounted to fifty-four thousand men, and the national guards to a hundred and fifty thousand more; that the fortresses were fully armed and provisioned, and in the best possible state of defence; and that everything was prepared for the most vigorous resistance. But already serious divisions had broken out in the army, especially between the guards and the troops of the line; and dissensions of the most violent kind had arisen between the leaders of the revolt, especially the Cardinal Ruffo and the chiefs of the Carbonari. The consequence was, that when the moment of action arrived, scarce any resistance was made. On 8th February a courier from Laybach announced at Naples that all hope of accommodation was at an end, and that the sovereigns assembled there would in no shape recognise the revolutionary authorities at Naples. The effect of this announcement was terrible; it did not rouse resistance-it overpowered it by fear. In vain the assembly ordered fifty thousand of the national guards to be called out, and moved to the frontier; nothing efficient was done-terror froze every heart. The ministers of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, left Naples; the presence of ten French and eight English sail of the line in the bay rather excited alarm than inspired confidence. On the 4th February, General Frimont published from his headquarters at Padua a proclamation, announcing that his army was about to cross the Po, to assist in the pacification of Italy; and ii. 419, 424; on the following day the troops, nearly fifty thousand iv. 319,320. strong, commenced the passage of that river at five points between Cremona and St Benedetto.1 1 Colletta, Ann. Hist. |