Stalcup et al. v. Dixon. purchase was duly issued to him by the then auditor of said county, on the 6th day of March, 1883, therefor, which certificate of purchase was, in January, 1889, presented to Andrew J. Cox, the auditor of said county, by the holder thereof, and the deed in suit was then and there duly made and executed to the plaintiff by said auditor, on the 2d day of January, 1889. "9th. That since said purchase of said lots by the plaintiff, he has paid taxes thereon to the treasurer of said county for State, county, and township purposes, which were regularly assessed thereon for the years 1884 to 1887, both inclusive, the aggregate sum of $44.10. "10th. That plaintiff is entitled to twenty per cent. interest per annum on the said $46.80 so paid March 5th, 1883, as aforesaid, from that date, and the same rate of interest on each of said subsequent payments from the date thereof. "11th. That the said $46.80, so paid March 5th, 1883, with twenty (20) per cent. interest thereon per annum, amounts to $128.70, and the said subsequent payments of taxes with the interest thereon on each sum, at the same rate of interest per annum, amounts to $97.53. "12th. That the defendant Eli Stalcup is the owner in fee of the said real estate, subject to the lien of the plaintiff for said purchase money, taxes, penalty, interest and costs, amounting in all to the sum of $226.23. "JOHN C. BRIGGS, Judge. "Dated December 12th, 1891." And the court stated the following conclusions of law: "1st. That the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree quieting title to said real estate in his favor. "2d. That the defendant, Eli Stalcup, is entitled to have his title quieted as against plaintiff, subject to the lien of the plaintiff thereon, for $226.23 for purchase Stalcup et al. v. Dixon. money at the sale for taxes and taxes paid on said real estate since the 5th day of March, 1883. "3d. That the plaintiff is entitled to a foreclosure of his lien on said lots for $226.23, and that the same be declared a first lien thereon. "JOHN C. BRIGGS, Judge. "Dated December 12th, 1891." The error which appellants principally complain of is that the trial court allowed too much interest, and hence the finding and judgment foreclosing the lien was for a sum greater than appellee was legally entitled to. Though the assignments of error are six in number, they present and raise no other question than that of the correctness of the conclusions of law. There was no motion for a new trial or for a venire de novo. It is true the rate of interest, or whether appellee was entitled to any interest, or during what part of the time he was so entitled, were all questions of law. The only conclusion of law stated having any bearing on that question is the third and last one, which concludes that appellee is entitled to a foreclosure of his lien for $226.23. The objection to this conclusion is not that appellee was not entitled to a foreclosure of his lien for some amount, but that it is for a larger amount than appellee is legally entitled to. That is, the amount found due for the taxes for which the sale was made, subsequent taxes paid, penalty, interest, and cost. Appellants concede that a part of it was due, and that appellee was entitled to a foreclosure for such amount. It is true the tenth special finding states a conclusion of law, namely, that appellee is entitled to twenty per cent. interest on the amount of tax for which he had bid in the lots and the subsequent taxes paid by him. In a special finding of facts, the conclusions of law Stalcup et al. v. Dixon. must embrace matters of law only and not matters of fact. Kealing v. Vansickle, 74 Ind. 529. And likewise conclusions of law erroneously cast into the finding of facts do not control, for the court must act upon the facts found. City of Indianapolis v. Kingsbury, 101 Ind. 200. The rule thus stated has for its foundation a good reason. When the trial is by the court its finding of the facts takes the place of the verdict of a jury. When the court states its conclusions of law it acts in an entirely different capacity, in no sense that of a jury. The finding of facts is as separate and distinct from the conclusions of law as if the facts had been found by a jury and the conclusions of law stated by the court. Now, if the jury should fail to find some essential fact in their special verdict, the court, in declaring the law thereon, could not supply the missing fact. So, too, if the jury should state in their special verdict a conclusion of law which the court omits in its declaration of the law arising thereon, such conclusion of law in the verdict could not be looked to in aid of the declaration of the law by the court. So there being no conclusion of law stated, the appellee was entitled to twenty per cent. interest, and if, as a matter of law, he was not entitled to that much interest, the final conclusion of law, which really embraced the twenty per cent. interest, was erro neous. But we have looked into the question, and find that appellants have no cause to complain, even of the conclusion of law cast into the special finding of facts, as to the interest. They first contend that as the appellee did not take his auditor's deed on the tax sale until the 2d day of January, 1889, no interest was allowable after two years and six months next following the date of the tax sale on Stalcup et al. v. Dixon. March 5th, 1883, namely, from and after September 5th, 1885, to the day of trial, to wit, December 12th, 1891, no interest could be legally allowed at all on the amount due appellee on his certificate, which would be a little more than six years and three months; and that the trial court did embrace in its finding interest during said. period. This contention is based on the provisions of the R. S. 1881, section 6466, reading as follows: "The owner or occupant of any land sold for taxes, or any other person having an interest therein, may redeem the same at any time during the two years next ensuing, in the following manner: If redeemed within six months from the day of sale, he shall pay to the county treasurer, for the use of the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, the full sum of the purchase-money named in his certificate, and all the costs of sale, together with ten per centum in addition; if redeemed after six months and within one year, he shall pay, in like manner, the purchase-money, together with costs and fifteen per centum in addition; if redeemed after one year and within two years, he shall pay in like manner the purchase-money, together with costs and twenty-five per cent. in addition; and he shall also pay all taxes which have been paid thereon, with interest at the rate of six per centum per annum on such taxes. In case the party purchasing the land, or his assigns, fail to take a tax deed for the land. so purchased within six months after the expiration of the two years no interest shall be charged or collected. from the redemptioner after that time.' Section 228 of the same act, being section 6497,R. S. 1881, provides, in substance, that if the conveyance of the county auditor shall prove invalid, with certain exceptions immaterial to notice here, the lien which the State had shall be transferred by such deed to the Stalcup et al. v. Dixon. grantee, his heirs and assigns, who shall be entitled to recover from the owner the amount of such legal taxes and costs with interest at eight per cent. from the date of sale, together with all subsequent taxes paid with like interest, all to be a lien to be enforced in any action affecting the purchaser's rights under the tax deed. Section 6496 provides for ten per cent. where the holder of the tax deed seeks, by an action in court, to quiet his title and it proves invalid. It will be observed that a very different rate of interest is provided in these two latter sections, from that provided in the former. The latter provide for only eight and ten per cent. all through; the former provides on redemption within six months for ten per cent., on redemption within one year fifteen per cent., and on redemption after one year and within two years, twentyfive per cent. It is self-evident that the three sections were not intended to apply to the same state of facts, because if so intended they would be repugnant to and destroy each other. But it is manifest from the language of the first, that its terms make it applicable only to a case where the land is being redeemed by the owner; and the latter two sections apply only to a case where redemption is not being attempted, but to a case where, in an action in court, some rights are attempted to be enforced under the tax deed and it proves invalid. That is the kind of case this was, and it was not a case under section 6466, because no attempt was made to redeem. So, therefore, the circuit court did not err in allowing appellee interest for the whole time. It is next contended that the trial court erroneously allowed twenty per cent. interest, whereas the latter section only allowed eight per cent. The appellee contends that the latter section was so amended by the act of |