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Columbia County Liquor Licenses.

legislative interpretation as to the kind of liquor for which it is necessary to obtain retail license is contained in the title of the Act of July 30, 1897, P. L 464, supra. That act is entitled "An act to provide revenue and regulate the sale of malt, brewed, vinous and spirituous liquors, or any admixture thereof, by requiring and authorizing licenses to be taken out by brewers, distillers, wholesalers, bottlers, rectifiers, compounders, storekeepers and agents having a store, office or place of business wihtin this Commonwealth, prescribing the amount of license fees to be paid in such cases, and by imposing an additional fee on retail dealers in intoxicating liquors." This act provides in its 1st section that only "dealers in intoxicating liquors, either spirituous, vinous, malt or brewed," shall pay the fees therein provided. It then provides in the 2nd section for increased fees to be paid by retailers to the State, and leaves the fees to be paid to the local authorities for retail license at the figures theretofore fixed by law. We think the title to this act, concluding, as it does, with the words "imposing an additional fee on retail dealers in intoxicating liquors", shows that the legislative intent and meaning was that only fees were required to be paid and licenses procured for the sale of "intoxicating liquors", and if that be so, it follows that no license is necessary under said law to sell a non-intoxicating liquor. In addition to this, we think that the Federal Government has taken jurisdiction of the question of the sale of nonintoxicating beverages under the provision of the National Prohibition Act above referred to, and that it supersedes the provisions of our State license law in regard to the sale of any spirituous, vinous, malt or brewed liquor, regardless of alcoholic content, and that we can no longer grant licenses under our Act of 1897 to sell any such liquors, intoxicating or non-intoxicating. As having some bearing on our view that the Federal law intends to permit the unrestrained sale for beverage purposes of any nonintoxicating spirituous, vinous, malt or brewed liquors, and that license therefor is not necessary, the Internal Revenue Collector of the 12th District has advised us that "any one selling beverages containing less than one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol need comply with no Federal license regulations, such as the wholesale and retail dealer licenses."

Our attention has been called to the fact that the Attorney

Columbia County Liquor Licenses.

General of Pennsylvania has recently ruled that it is necessary to have a license for the sale of any spirituous, vinous, malt or brewed liquor containing less than one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol by volume, because the Brooks High License Law is silent upon the question of the alcoholic content of such liquor. If this position is correct, then it would seem to follow that the sale of "grape juice" (the pure juice of the grape, and, therefore, a vinous liquor, and a drink made famous by prominent endorsement) must be regulated by license. In thirty-three years since the passage of the Brooks High License Law of 1887 we have never heard it even suggested that a license for the sale of such a product of the grape was necessary. He seems, further, to have taken the position that, although the State of Pennsylvania has not passed any legislation designed to enforce the constitutoinal amendment under authority given the states by section. 2 of the amendment of "concurrent power" to enforce the amendment, yet our Act of 1887 may be regarded as 'concurrent legislation" to enforce the amendment in regard to the sale of beverages containing less than one-half of 1 per cent. alcohol, etc. While we have great respect for the source of that opinion, it is difficult for us to see how an act of assembly in this State, passed nearly thirty-three years ago, can be in any sense regarded as "concurrent" legislation to enforce a constitutional amendment taking effect Jan. 16, 1920. The Brooks Law of 1887 is altogether out of tune with the spirit, purpose and intent of the Federal amendment and the National Prohibition Act. It is directly at war with it, and there is an utter lack of harmony between the two statutes. Under our act, we are permitted to grant licenses for the sale of liquor at wholesale and retail which contains alcohol without limit. We believe, as before stated, that we can grant no wholesale license in view of the Federal law, as such licenses are required to be obtained only by those "dealing in intoxicating liquors." Under our retail licenses, liquor containing alcohol without limit may likewise be sold. Clearly under no circumstances, in view of the Federal law, could we grant a license as here applied for under which one could lawfully sell at retail any liquor containing half of 1 per cent. or more of alcohol by volume. Any retail license we might now grant must limit the retailer to the sale of liquors containing less than half of 1 per cent. of alcohol by volume, and we do not believe that we have the right to grant an emasculated license. We grant to sell under

Columbia County Liquor Licenses.

our act such licenses as are applied for or not at all. Even if we may grant such limited licenses, we are none the less relieved from the provisions of the Act of 1887 in the granting thereof. In the case of a new applicant, then we would be obliged to go through the solemn nonsense, in passing on his application, of adjudging the necessity of the place for the accommodations of the public, etc., and the moral character and temperate habits of the applicant; all for the privilege of selling a non-intoxicating beverage The whole situation calls for new legislation.

Nor can we see why we should be so jealous of our ancient statute as to wish to hold fast to the last shred or remnant thereof under which we might possibly grant a license for the sale of liquor at retail, which is admittedly harmless, so far as its intoxicating qualities are concerned. Any doubt, if doubt there is as to our right to grant licenses, we prefer to resolve in favor of the supremacy of the Federal law. We are of the opinion that we are without jurisdiction to grant the licenses as prayed for, and our order of Jan. 19, 1920, refusing all licenses, is to stand as the final order in this case.

From Wm. Chrisman, Bloomsburg, Pa.

Quarter Sessions of Montgomery County

In Re-Granting Liquor Licenses in Montgomery County

Per Curiam March 22, 1920.

We examined all the liquor applications filed in the said Court. We concluded to grant the applications that were in proper form, but with the proviso that the respective licenses shall hold their grants subject to the laws of this Commonwealth and the laws of the United States of America, and that they shall not brew, distill, manufacture, vend, or sell any liquor or liquors prohibited by law.

The Clerk of the Court will note on the certificates issued to the licensees the foregoing proviso, and any applicant accepting such certificate does hereby agree faithfully to observe all the provisions of the laws of this Commonwealth and the laws of the United States of America relating to such liquors.

VOL. XXXVI-No. 21

Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Reilly et al. v. The Prudential Insurance Co. of America

A on June 1st, 1900, signed a contract with B an Insurance Company to act as its general agent, at the same time that the contract was signed a policy of insurance was issued to S. Little over a year later the contract between A and B was, by mutual agreement, cancelled. A assigned his rights to commission to C. Suit was brought to recover commissions alleged to have been due under the contract by the administrators of C who was A's assignee. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, defendant then moved for judgment N. O. V.

In order that recovery could be had on the contract it became necessary to introduce evidence of the contract of insurance made on the same day that A was appointed General Agent. The defence alleged that this could not be done, because A had no right under the existing laws to act as the representative of B and the rights of C, the assignee, could rise no higher than that of A, for under the law, before a person has a right to act as an Insurance Agent of a foreign company, it is necessary that such persons be dully licensed by the Insurance Commissioner. The right of plaintiff to claim commissions, as set forth in his statement in this case neessitated including in the amounts of premiums paid the premium paid by S on the policy at the date when the general agency contract was signed. A, at this time, was not duly licensed by the Insurance Commissioner and under the law as laid down in other jurisdictions, he could not collect commissions due under an illegal contract, and although he subsequently became a License Insurance Agent its effect is not to make legal, although both parties agreed that it should be done, .contracts entered into prior to the granting of such license.

The personal representatives of C, assignee of A, are therefore not entitled to recover under the facts set forth, because A obtained the policies on the life of S while unauthorized by the Insurance Commissioners to transact business in this State as the Agent of defendant Foreign Insurance Company, and judgment in favor of defendant and against the plaintiffs N. O. V. must be granted.

Motion for Judgment N. O. V.

No. 99, March Term, 1917.

Evans, High, Dettra & Swartz, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

F. J. Shoyer, Attorney for Defendant.

Opinion by Miller, J., Aug. 1, 1918.

The legal plaintiff was a general agent in Pennsylvania of the defendant, an insurance company incorporated under the laws of New Jersey and authorized to transact business in this state, duly appointed as such by written contract dated June 1, 1900. That contract was terminated by mutual consent on July 21, 1901. Mr. Reilly, who, by its terms and after its termination, was to receive commissions on annual renewal premiums on policies written by or through him, while he was such agent, assigned his rights thereunder to the use plaintiffs, and this suit

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