Review: The evolution of cooperation

Starting from a social-scientific view of human nature which assumes that individuals behave egoistically, U. of Michigan political scientist Axelrod seeks to account for cooperative behavior--through computer games. Axelrod invited eminent game theorists from economics, psychology, and other fields to enter a tournament centered on the now-famous Prisoner's Dilemma: is it in the interests of each of two individuals to cooperate or not cooperate under specific circumstances? (Briefly, it is in the interests of both parties to claim innocence and receive a middling punishment than for one to tell on the other; but it is in the interests of each separately to tell, not knowing what the other will do.) Programs were submitted for this ""iterated"" Prisoner's Dilemma game--i.e., there would be a continuous sequence of moves rather than one single choice--and the winner turned out to be ""TIT FOR TAT"": a solution which said that after the first move, the second player would reciprocate. When pitted against more complicated strategies, the model of reciprocity always won. This leads Axelrod to the conclusion that in a context of repeated interaction, a pattern of behaving ""nicely"" will dominate a pattern of ""meanness,"" and result in cooperative behavior. (Axelrod ran his tournament twice, the second time with many more participants and with all of them informed of the outcome of the first tournament; the TIT FOR TAT entry won again.) If non-game players intuitively respond that this is a strange way to state the obvious, Axelrod's turn to a historical example seen through TIT FOR TAT eyes shows that this is indeed the case. The example is WW I trench warfare and the well-known case of fraternization across the trenches. With the same soldiers facing each other day after day, some individuals on both sides adopted a strategy of not trying to shoot each other; only outsiders, not part of the game, broke the peace (e.g., lobbing artillery shells from a distance). Axelrod thinks his model explains the phenomenon, but it may just as well be said that the phenomenon explains the model. His lame suggestions for ""players"" in diplomacy and business are to get to know each other and to remember that the game will go on for a while. Then act nice, but retaliate immediately if the other side ""defects,"" forcing them to be nice too. Not a breakthrough.

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This may be one of the most important books of the 20th century. Axlerod has done for ethics what Gailieo did for physics and Mendel did for genetics. There are still many "delimas" to be solved, but this shows the way to move the questions of ethics from debate to experimental science.

Review: The Evolution Of Cooperation

Axelrod takes on the problem of how cooperation can emerge in a world of self-seeking egoists without a central authority. The question has important implications for the evolution of cooperation ... Read full review

Review: The Evolution of Cooperation

Excellent book. Read full review

Review: The Evolution of Cooperation

A bit academic, but still pretty easy to read and a fun exploration of the prisoner's dilemma in a wide variety of hypothetical and concrete contexts. You may also recognize parts of this from a ... Read full review

Review: The Evolution of Cooperation

I know some basic game theory, so I thought that this book would be redundant. Yes, I get it - Tit-For-Tat is the winning strategy in iterated Prisoners' Dilemma games, etc. I frankly bought the book ... Read full review

Review: The Evolution of Cooperation

http://pro-libertate.net/20090114/47-... Read full review

Review: The Evolution of Cooperation

To say that a book is required reading is a term that, these days, is very overused (as an aside, to say that something is a term that, these days is very overused is in itself a term that, these days ... Read full review

Review: The Evolution of Cooperation

As the title indicates this book explores the topic of cooperation, particularly how it can emerge in a decentralized population that seeks individual maximization of self-interest. The book is split ... Read full review